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I. INTRODUCTION
“Since the late eighteenth century, the Constitution of the
United States and the constitutions of several states have
guaranteed U.S citizens the right to a jury trial. This fundamental
right can only be waived if a party knowingly and voluntarily agree,
giving courts every reasonable presumption against waiver.”1 These
1. Meyer v. Kalanick, No. 15-16178, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99921, at *1
439
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are the words of Judge Jed Redkoff, of the Southern District of New
York. Judge Redkoff held when Uber Technologies (“Uber”) could
not compel arbitration on an individual pursing collective relief.2
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (“Ninth Circuit”) in Mohammed
v. Uber Tech, Inc., however, agreed with Uber, ordering Uber
drivers to submit to arbitration. The Ninth Circuit held Uber
drivers waived all claims to forego Uber’s arbitration agreement for
the drivers failed to opt-out of Uber’s arbitration agreement.3 This
decision not only changed the landscape in pending Uber litigation,
but delivered a devastating blow to drivers seeking redress from
administrative agencies.4 With the exception of Judge Redkoff and
California District Court Judge, Ed Chen, both skeptics of
“clickwrap” contracts, other courts have ruled similarly to the Ninth
Circuit,5 leading many to believe Uber has finally found a solution
to their litigation problems.6

(S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2016) (Rakoff, R.) (quoting Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy to Use
of Bogash, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1973)).
2. Kat Greene, Rakolf Slams ‘Legal Fiction’ In Nixing Uber Arbitration Bid,
LAW 360 (July 29, 2016), www.law360.com/articles/823375/rakoff-slams-legalfiction-in-nixing-uber-arbitration-bid (quoting Judge Rakoff stating arbitration
agreements online as a “legal fiction.”). See Alison Frankel, Uber’s Arbitration
Appeal at the 2nd Circuit is Big Test for Internet Businesses, REUTERS
(November 30, 2016) (stating Uber is taking Judge Rakoff’s decision to the 2nd
U.S Circuit of Appeals).
3. Daniel Fisher, Appeals Court Deals Blow to Uber Class Actions, Holding
Arbitration Pacts Enforceable, FORBES (Sept. 7, 2016), www.forbes.com/
sites/danielfisher/2016/09/07/appeals-court-deals-blow-to-uber-class-actionsholding-arbitration-pacts-enforceable/#494327e034fa (last visited Mar. 2, 2017)
(stating the Ninth Circuit held arbitration agreements where drivers do not optout are enforceable). See Mohamed v. Uber Tech. Inc., No. 15-16178, No. 1516181, No. 15-16250, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 16413 at *1 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding
the District Court exceeded their authority in deciding whether the arbitration
agreements were enforceable regarding the California Private Attorney
General Act) (hereinafter PAGA).
4. Joel Rosenblatt and Patricia Hurtado, Uber Gains Leverage Against
Drivers with Arbitration Ruling, BLOOMBERG TECHNOLOGY, (September 7,
2016) (“The ruling gives Uber the upper hand in a hard-fought lawsuit covering
385,000 current and former drivers in California and Massachusetts who sued
to be treated as employees rather than independent contractors.”).
5. Meyer, No. 15-16178, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99921 at *7 (stating
‘clickwrap (or ‘click-through’) agreements make a “website users are required to
click on an ‘I agree’ box after being presented with a list of terms and conditions
of use.”). See Mohamed v. Uber Techs., Inc., 109 F. Supp. 3d 1185, 1196 (N.D.
Cal 2015) rev’d 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 16413 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding a clickwrap
agreement provided adequate notice of contract terms).
6. See Bruster v. Uber Techs. Inc., No. 15-CV-2653, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
67532 at *14-15 (N.D. Ohio May 23, 2016) (granting Uber’s motion to compel
arbitration because the Uber drivers were bound to the 2014 agreement the
drivers had agreed to); Suarez v. Uber Tech., Inc., No. 8:16-cv-166-Y-30MAP,
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59241 at *1 (M.D. Fla. May 4, 2016) (concluding Uber’s
arbitration provision was not unconscionable and the drivers improperly
brought their claim as collective/class action). See also Varon v. Uber Tech., Inc.,
No. MJG-15-3650, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94325 at *1 (D. Md. July 20, 2016)
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The Ninth Circuit awarded Uber a big win, yet, litigation
continues to ensue, evidencing Uber’s failure to fix their litigation
woes. In regards to Uber’s arbitration agreements, for major
concerns exist: (1) whether Uber drivers are aware of the
arbitration agreement (2) whether Uber drivers can understand the
agreement’s language; (3) whether the arbitration agreements limit
drivers’ rights to administrative agencies’ relief; and (4) whether
the arbitration agreements violate state labor laws such as the
Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”).
The first problem with Uber’s arbitration agreements is
drivers either do not understand the arbitration agreement. Or
Uber drivers do not know the arbitration agreement exists in the
employment contract because no attention is drawn to arbitration
agreement nor is the arbitration’s procedure clearly stated.7 This is
not only problematic for drivers, but is unjust, for most Uber drivers
speak English as a second language, or the drivers do not possess
the necessary education to understand Uber’s arbitration clause.8
The Ninth Circuit’s opinion reveals how challenging it is to
interpret an arbitration agreement. It can be difficult to determine
whether the issue in the agreement should be decided by the judge
or the arbitrator, because an average person has to interpret the
contract.9 The Ninth Circuit’s decision highlights the need for the
Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) to be reformed to ensure the
average citizen can adhere to the Act’s procedures.
It also highlights why Congress should modify the FAA to

(debating whether the question of arbitrability is for the arbitrator or court);
Cullinane v. Uber Techs., Inc., Civil Action No. 14-14750-DPW, 2016 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 88808 at *1 (D. Mas. July 8, 2016) (addressing whether a court can
compel arbitration when the driver agreed to the terms of Uber’s contract
online). But see NLRB v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 16-mc-80057-KAW, 2016 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 145069 at *1 (N.D. Cal. October 19, 2016) (granting the NLRB’s
application to enforce subpoenas regarding Uber’s work practices); Razak v.
Uber Tech., Inc., Civil Action No. 16-573, 2016 U.S. LEXIS 1733531, at *1 (E.D.
Pa. December 14, 2016) (denying Uber’s motion to dismiss to Uber drivers
claiming Uber violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (hereinafter FLSA) by
withholding earnings).
7. Yanelys Crespo, Uber v. Regulation: “Ride-Sharing Creates a Legal Gray
Area, 25 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 79, 83 (2016) (“regulation and innovation do not
work together in the current regulatory scheme.”). See Carolyn Said, Uber Bans
Drivers from Class-Action Lawsuit Participation, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE
(December 14, 2015), www.govtech.com/applications/uber-bans-drivers-fromclass-action-lawsuit-participation.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2017) (explaining
how Uber drivers are not aware of the company’s arbitration agreements
contained within their employment contract).
8. Id. (“Many Uber drivers speak English as second language and would
have a lot of trouble reading and deciphering a 21-page PDF”) (quoting Harry
Campbell, Los Angles driver who writes TheRideshareGuy.com blog).
9. John E Murry & Timothy Murray, Unconscionability and the Duty to
Read in CORBIN ON CONTRACTS DESK EDITION EMERGING LAW OF
UNCONSCIONABILITY, § 29.03, (2017) (discussing all the relevant case law the
Ninth Circuit considered in deciding the Mohammed decision).
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adapt to modern technological contracts, and to prevent companies
from abusing their power over those they contract with.10
Arbitration clauses are often badly drafted and greatly increase the
cost of the dispute significantly.11 This concern coupled with the
signor accepting the arbitration agreement on a phone application
or small tablet screen inhibits the signor’s ability to assent to the
arbitration agreement. Mutual assent is a requirement for a
contract to be legally enforceable.
Another major concern is an arbitration agreement’s ability to
preclude a claimant from accessing remedies provided by
administrative law.12 The Ninth Circuit’s holding restricts drivers
from vindicating their most basic rights;13 however, several states
and federal administrative agencies are pushing back on the Ninth
Circuit’s opinion. The National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”)
fears the opinion will continue to limit the scope of the National
Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”)14 by barring administrative agencies
from exercising their statutory authority.15 The Seventh Circuit has
responded to this fear, and as a result, took a strong stance against
allowing the FAA to interfere with employees right to purse joint
action in violation of the NLRA.16 The Supreme Court is currently
addressing this issue, and will issue an opinion during this
10. Catherine V.W. Stone and Alexander J.S. Colvin, The Arbitration
Epidemic: Mandatory Arbitration Deprives Workers and Consumers of their
Rights, ECON. POLICY INST. 6-10 (2015), www.epi.org/publication/thearbitration-epidemic/ (last visited Feb. 8th, 2017) (discussing how the U.S.
Supreme Court has enabled corporations to compel customers and employees
into arbitration, which in effect limits employees and customers’ ability to
receive redress).
11. Marissa Marinelli and Andrew Choi, When Pre-Arbitration
Requirements Lead to Disputes over Dispute Resolution Clauses, NEW YORK
LAW JOURNAL (March 13, 2017),
https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/almID/1202780913920/whenprearbitration-requirements-lead-to-disputes-over-dispute-resolutionclauses/?slreturn=20180707104419
12. Maureen A. Weston, The Clash: Squaring Mandatory Arbitration with
Administrative Agency and Representative Recourse, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 104, 120
(2015) (explaining the significance of the court’s holding in Sonic II). SonicCalabasas A. Inc. v. Moreno, 57 Cal 4th 1109, 1133 (2013), cert denied, 134 S.
Ct. 2724 (2014) (hereinafter Sonic II) (holding private arbitration agreements
can disallow an employee access to the administrative process, and other state
and federal agencies regulating areas in healthcare, worker’s compensation,
and consumer protection).
13. Stone and Colvin, supra note 10 (discussing how forcing litigants into
arbitration limit litigants’ substantive rights; and limits opportunities to
effectively vindicate rights).
14. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.S. § 158 (1935) (hereinafter
NLRA); Private Attorneys General Act, Labor Code § 2699 (2016) (explaining
PAGA’s purpose is for employees to enforce labor codes of California).
15. D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 2277 (2012) (hereinafter “Horton I”);
Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2014), cert granted, 137 S. Ct.
809 (2017).
16. Id.
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Comment’s publication.
Lastly, the Ninth Circuit’s decision did not interpret the
language regarding PAGA.17 The Ninth Circuit did not decide if the
language should be severed from the remainder of the arbitration
agreement or if the language invalidated the entire arbitration
agreement. The California Legislature enacted PAGA to allow an
“aggrieved employee to bring a civil action personally and on behalf
of other current or former employees to recover civil penalties for
Labor Code violations.”18 PAGA’s legislative purpose is to protect
individuals through the use of state labor law. The legislature
intended that employees be their own enforcement agency.
Therefore, the legislature granted employees the right to recover
from companies.19 Without the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of
PAGA, aggrieved drivers do not know if they have a right to assert
a PAGA claim.
The Ninth Circuit’s trailblazing precedent has limited
complainants’ access to courts and other administrative remedies,20
prompting the following questions: Will courts allow companies to
exert their contractual power in order to limit the scope of
individuals’ constitutional rights to trial? Or, are Judge Chen and
Judge Redkoff’s holdings the beginning step to promulgate
sweeping change? This Comment discusses these issues below.
This Comment begins with a background section that discusses
the creation of Uber, the historical application of arbitration
clauses, and the application of arbitration clauses contracts,
including the use of arbitration clauses in app-based technology
agreements.21 This section also touches on the Ninth Circuit’s
decision in Mohamed, and other Federal Court decisions regarding
the enforcement of Uber’s arbitration clause.22
Next, this Comment provides an analysis section that
discusses the Ninth Circuit’s decision. The analysis attempts to
interpret the arbitration agreement’s delegation clause and PAGA
waiver, deciphering the Ninth’s Circuit’s reasoning to enforce
17. Private Attorneys General Act, Labor Code § 2699 (explaining PAGA’s
purpose is for employees to enforce labor codes of California).
18. Iskanian v. CLS Transp. LA, LLC., 327 P.3d 129, 146 (Cal. 2014) cert.
denied, 135 S. Ct. 1155 (2015) (quoting Cal. Lab. Code § 2699 subd. (a)).
19. Iskanian, 327 P.3d at 147. See Arias v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. 4th 969,
985 (2009) (stating the Legislature intended a PAGA action to be binding on the
named employee, government agencies, and any aggrieved employee not a party
to the proceeding).
20. Mohamed v. Uber Tech. Inc., 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 16413 at *33.
Weston, supra note 12 at 105 (asking the question if mandatory arbitration
agreements displace parties’ rights to access administrative agencies).
21. Rebecca Elaine Elliot, Note, Sharing App or Regulation Hack(ney)?
Defining Uber Technologies, Inc., 41 IOWA CORP. L. 727, 733 (2016). See infra
Section II, A (discussing Uber). See also UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
www.uber.com (last visited Oct. 6, 2016) (explaining Uber’s creation).
22. See infra Section II C, D (analyzing the history of arbitration and how
arbitration is delegated to the arbitrator).
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arbitration.23 It then analyzes whether the arbitration agreement
was unconscionable, suggesting the Ninth Circuit should have
considered relevant case law for online arbitration agreements.24
The analysis section then discusses the effect the Ninth Circuit’s
opinion will have on drivers and their ability to vindicate their
rights by seeking collective relief from courts and administrative
agencies.25
Lastly, this Comment explains that reform to Federal
Arbitration Act is long overdue.26 Yet, destroying precedent is not a
viable solution because of instability of the current U.S. Supreme
Court.27 Instead, this comment proposes Congress should reform
the Federal Arbitration Act and implement reform through the
regulation of agencies.28

II. UBER ARBITRATION: AN OVERVIEW
A. The Existence of Uber: An App-Based
Transportation Company
Uber, since its foundation in 2010, has become a multinational
company that makes transportation more convenient through the
use of a smartphone app.29 So what is Uber?”30 Uber is:
A location-based app that makes hiring an on-demand private
driver…easy. For riders - Uber is a convenient, inexpensive
and safe taxi service. Hire a private driver to pick you up & take you
to your destination with the tap of a button on any smartphone
device. A nearby driver often arrives to pick you up within minutes.
Not only is this an on-demand car service, but you can even watch as
your driver is en-route to come pick you up.
For drivers - Uber provides exceptional pay, allows you to be your own
boss, and even receive tips. Take on fares whenever you wish (work
as much or as little as you desire) while meeting new people in your
city from all walks of life.31

23. See infra Section III A, B (analyzing why the Ninth Circuit incorrectly
ruled in for Uber).
24. See infra Section III, C (discussing the unconscionable arbitration
agreement and the Ninth Circuit’s failure to analyze the different between
clickwrap and browsewrap agreements).
25. See infra Section III, D (analyzing the vindication of rights doctrine in
regard to class actions, PAGA, and the NLRA).
26. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14. [Hereinafter “FAA”].
27. See infra Section IV (discussing the problems with the FAA).
28. See infra Section IV (proposing new solutions to protect drivers in the
future).
29. Elliot, supra note 21 at 727. See Uber, supra note 21 (explaining how
Uber operates and how user access the app).
30. So, What is Uber? UBER ESTIMATES, (2018) www.uberestimate.com/
about-uber/.
31. Id.
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Uber has taken off since 2010 and has “exploded onto the scene,
displacing traditional taxi and delivery services around the
world.”32
Once a driver meets Uber’s requirements, the driver must then
enter into the “Raiser Software Sublicense & Online Services
Agreement.”33 To sign the agreement, the driver must log on to the
Uber app, sign up as a driver, and click on a hyperlink.34 When the
hyperlink is up on the screen the driver must click “Yes, I agree”
and then click “confirm,” to begin driving.35
If a dispute arises with Uber, a driver can initiate arbitration
with a written demand and an arbitrator will be assigned to the
dispute.36 Drivers who do not know Uber’s arbitration agreements
exist, do not want to be compelled into arbitration or bring a class
action suit. Rather, they want to file their complaints in district
court or with the National Labor Relations Board.37 The NLRB,
under the NLRA, certifies employees to self-organize and form labor
organizations, and enter into collective bargaining agreements with
their employers.38 If the NLRB rules in favor of employees and are
successful in bringing a claim against their employers, then the

32. Erin Mitchell, Comment, Uber’s Loophole in the Regulatory System, 6
HOUSTON LAW REVIEW 75 at *1 (2015) (providing that to become a driver an
individual must confirm the following requirements: 1) the individual is twentyone years old; 2) the individual has one year of driving experience in the U.S
and three years of driving experience if under the age of twenty-three; 3) the
individual has a valid U.S. driver’s license; 4) the individual drives a 4-door
vehicle; the individual can show proof of vehicle registration and insurance, and
5) the individual can show a satisfactory driving record and acceptable criminal
history).
33. Zawada v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 16-cv-1134, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
178582 at *3 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 27, 2016).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36.
UBER
TECHNOLOGIES,
INC.,
U.S.
Terms
of
Use,
www.uber.com/legal/terms/us/ (last visited Feb. 7th, 2017). See O’Connor v.
Uber Techs. Inc., 82 F. Supp 3d 1133, 1138 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (discussing one of
the most litigated issues involving Uber’s categorization of their drivers has
independent contractors or third-party providers, and not employees). See
generally Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co. LLC., 61 Cal 4th 899,922 (2015)
(explaining Uber prefers drivers to be excluded from labor laws, so drivers do
not benefit from worker’s compensation labor laws, and ERISA).
37. See NLRB v. Uber Techs. Inc., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145069 at *1-2
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2016) (“Multiple Uber drivers have filed charges against
Uber for violations of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § § 151, et seq.”). See Mohamed v.
Uber Tech. Inc., 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 16413 at *1 (arguing Uber’s arbitration
clause cannot compel arbitration). See also O’Connor, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
116482 at *135 (allowing Plaintiffs class action to be certified to pursue their
claim that Uber violated Section 351 of the Labor Code).
38. 29 U.S.C. 159(c)(1)(A). See NLRB v. Alt Entm’t Inc., 858 F. 3d 392, 415
(6th Cir. 2017) (explaining Section 7 of the NLRA “self-organization, forming
labor organizations [and] bargain[ing] collectively through representatives of
their own choosing,” all activities section 7 expressly protects, are hardly thing
that employees just do...”).
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employer has two options.39 The employer can either: (1) contest the
petition before the NLRB or (2) the employer can bring a claim to
courts.40 The NLRB has taken a strong stance against arbitration,
as the NLRA grants employees a right “to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations and to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing.”41
However, when an arbitration provision is in an employment
agreement, procedural due process rights can change and
employees can be forced into arbitration; as courts have upheld
Congress’s strong presumption in favor of enforcing arbitration.42
Thus, in effect, drivers are not allowed to bring any claims to court
and drivers are not allowed to ask courts to rule on the delegation
clause to determine whether the arbitration agreements are
unconscionable.43
As of today, the legal system has not adapted to the new
“groundbreaking
technological
innovations.”44
Lawmakers
attempting to regulate Uber have endured difficulty in applying the
current law to the company’s new work practices.45 States have also
failed to effectively regulate the company because of Uber’s
innovative business operation through their app.46 European
countries, such as Germany, Spain, Italy and France, banned
Uber’s use because of the complexities in trying to regulate the
licensing of drivers.47 In the United States, both Alaska and Nevada
39. NLRB 29 C.F.R. 101.30; 29 C.F.R. 102.69(c)(1)(ii).
40. Id.
41. Alt. Entm’t, Inc., 858 F 3d. 393, 415 (6th Cir. 2017); Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB,
437 U.S. 556, 565-566 (1978) (stating “Congress knew well enough that labor’s
cause often is advanced on fronts other than collective bargaining [and]
recognized this factor by choosing, as the language of Section 7 makes clear, to
protect concerted activities for somewhat broader purpose of ‘mutual aid or
protections as well as for the narrower purposes of ‘self-organization’ and
‘collective bargaining.’”). See Brady v. Nat’l Football 644 F. 3d 661 (8th Cir.
2011) (“[A] lawsuit filed in good faith by a group of employees to achieve more
factorable terms or conditions is “concerted activity under Section 7 of the
NLRA.”).
42. AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744 (2011) (stating
if the NLRA were construed to prohibit collective bargaining and class waivers,
the NLRA would “interfere with fundamental attributes of arbitration”);
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974) (“holding the FAA cannot
harmonize the FAA with the NLRA because the express congressional intent in
the FAA favors arbitration.”).
43. Mohamed v. Uber Tech. Inc., 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 16413 at *11-19 (9th
Cir. 2016); Zawada v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 16-cv-11334, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
178582 at *8-28 (E.D. Mich. 2016).
44. Yanelys, supra note 7 at 88.
45. Id.
46. See Rebecca Elaine Elliot, Note, Sharing App or Regulationa Hack(ney)?:
Defining Uber Technologies, Inc., 41 IOWA J. CORP L. 727 (Spring 2016)
(analyzing Uber’s business to bypass regulation).
47. Id. at 727 n. 8. See Jefferson Graham, Talking Tech: Taxi Alternatives
Are on the Move, USA TODAY (June 26, 2013), www.usatoday.com/story/
tech/columnist/talkingtech/2013/06/26/taxi-alternatives-uber-lyft-sidecar/
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banned Uber until Uber agreed to comply with the States’ laws.48
A company that began as a not-for-profit technological sharing
company has blossomed into a company generating more than $15
billion in revenue, and is predicted to be worth more than $335
billion by 2025.49 The quick growth of Uber has outdated current
transportation regulations, for the current laws “were not designed
to regulate collaborative relationships, transactions, and
organization.”50 Therefore, lawmakers must completely “reevaluate and re-develop laws”51 in order to regulate Uber, ensure
the safety of Uber’s customers and consumers, and provide fair
competition to other transportation companies.

B. Arbitration: The Creation
Many facets exist to arbitration clauses and their
enforceability. This section discusses the implementation of
arbitration.52 Second, this section discusses arbitrations
enforceability and unconscionability.53 Third, this section discusses
class arbitrations. 54 Lastly, this section discusses administrative
agencies, and how the FAA conflicts with agencies’ labor laws.55

2453967 (last visited Mar. 12, 2017) (explaining that taxi drivers are unfairly
losing revenue because Uber drivers face less stringent regulation by not having
to be licenses with the city the driver operates in and not being subject to
traditional fee). See also Johana Bhuiyan, Here Is Where Uber and Lyft Are
Facing Regulation Battles in the United States, BUZZFEED NEWS (Dec. 15,
2014),
www.buzzfeed.com/johanabhuiyan/here-is-where-uber-and-lyft-arefacing-regulation-battles-in?utm_term=.egYDE0zA0x#.ujX7bnKR4
(last
visited Mar. 12. 2017) (stating a comprehensive list of major cities where Uber
is facing challenges).
48. Elliot, supra note 21 at 747 n. 97-99. But see Press Release, Governor
Terry McAuliffe, Virginia Reaches Temporary Agreement to Allow Safe,
Regulated Operation of Uber and Lyft (Aug. 5, 2014), www.governor.
virginia.gov/newsroom/newsarticle?articleId=5726 (last visited Mar. 2, 2017)
(stating Uber must apply for a broker transportation broker license, and must
comply with tax laws, maintain transparency, conduct extensive background
checks document each driver, and have insurance coverage).
49. Molly Cohen & Corey Zehngebot, What's Old Becomes New: Regulating
the Sharing Economy, 58 BOS. B.J., 34, 35 (2014). See John Hawksworth &
Robert Vaughan, The Sharing Economy—Sizing the Revenue Opportunity, PWC
UK BLOGS. (2014) http://pwc.blogs.com/files/sharing-economy-final_0814.pdf
(stating the findings of a report conducted by Pricewaterhouse Coopers).
50. Yanelys, supra note 7 at 83.
51. Id.
52. See infra Section II, B (discussing arbitration’s implementation into the
legal system).
53. See infra Section II, B (analyzing the complexities of arbitration).
54. See infra Section II, B, iii (describing class arbitration effect on
arbitration).
55. See infra Section II, B, iv (describing how administrative law conflicts
with the FAA).
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1. Implementation of Arbitration
Litigation in the past several decades has changed drastically.
Today, going to trial is perceived as a failure for all parties
involved.56 Parties no longer want the bad publicity, time
commitment, and expense of going to court.57 As a result,
arbitration has become a desired alternative.58 After the creation of
arbitration, courts, were nervous arbitrators would undermine
previous precedent and would not enforce arbitration agreements.59
This fear led Congress to pass the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”),
an act requiring courts to enforce arbitration agreements and
awards.60
As the FAA evolved, courts mandated that the FAA preempts
most state laws.61 Also, the FAA “creates federal substantive law
requiring the parties to honor arbitration agreements.”62
Arbitration involves “(a) a process to settle disputes between
parties; (b) a neutral third party; (c) an opportunity for the parties
to be heard; and (d) a final binding decision or award, by the neutral
third party after the hearing.”63 The FAA limited judicial review on
an arbitrators decisions.64 Therefore, arbitration agreements are
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable unless state-law revokes the
arbitration agreement.65

56. Richard D. Freer, Exodus from and Transformation of American Civil
Litigation, 65 EMORY L.J. 1492, 1507 (2016) (stating the change in litigation
has led to the creation of Alternative Dispute Resolution).
57. Id. Contra In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig., 685 F. 3d 1269, 12821283 (11th Cir. 2012) (explaining arbitration costs are expenses and can exceed
the fees of a lawyer).
58. In Re Checking Account Overdraft Litig., 685 F. 3d at 1282-1283 (stating
arbitration does not play a role in social order because arbitration goes on
behind closed doors, it is unseen and unreported to the public, it is not set to
one choice of law, and its outcome does not result in written opinions to guide
later courts).
59. Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, The Revolving Door of Justice:
Arbitration Agreements that Expand Court Review of an Award. 19 OHIO ST. J.
ON DISP. RESOL. 861, 865-870 (2004).
60. Freer, supra note 56 at 1501.
61. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011) (stating
the FAA purpose is to promote arbitration; and “embodies[ies] [the] national
policy favoring arbitration…not withstanding any state or substantive
procedural policies to the contrary.”) (citation omitted).
62. Ford v. Hamilton Inv., 29 F.3d 255, 257 (6th Cir. 1994).
63. Thomas J. Stipannwich, The Arbitration Penumbra: Arbitration Law
and Rapidly Changing Landscape of Dispute Resolution, 8 NEV. L.J. 427, 43343 (2007).
64. 9 U.S.C. §§ 10. See Hall Street Assocs. LLC. v. Mattel Inc., 552 U.S, 576,
591 (2008) (citing a court may not overturn an arbitrator’s decision because the
arbitrator made an error or “a serious error.”) (emphasis added).
65. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
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2. Arbitrations Enforceability
Congress’s push toward arbitration did not come without
limitations.66 Arbitration can be denied when arbitration does not
effectively vindicate
petitioners’ rights.67 Problematically,
Congress, by not specifying the scope of arbitration agreements, left
courts little guidance to determine when a judge or arbitrator
should decide a dispute.68 The FAA provides that when an
arbitration agreement is unambiguous and summits the parties to
arbitration, the agreement must be enforced.69 An exception to this
rule applies if a contract defense is applicable such as fraud,
unconscionability, duress, etc., making the arbitration clause
unenforceable.70
Contracts containing arbitration clauses are considered to be
two separate contracts.71 A principle known as the doctrine of
separability.72 “An arbitration agreement is an independent
agreement between the parties, that is separate from the
underlying contract.”73 As a result, contract defenses apply to the
contracts separately.74 For example, the Supreme Court in Prima
Paint Corp., did not allow the arbitrator to hear the plaintiffs’ claim
because the Plaintiff alleged the contract containing the arbitration
agreement was procured through fraud.75 Contract defenses
including illegality must be heard by a judge rather than an
arbitrator.76 In contrast, if the Plaintiff alleged the defectiveness of

66. Freer, supra note 56 at 1501.
67. McMullen v. Meijer Inc., 355 F.3d 485, 490-491 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding
the case should be remanded to determine whether the selection of the
arbitrator provision in the arbitration could be severed and the remainder of
the clause be enforced). See Green Tree Fin. Corp. Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S.
79, 92 (2000) (explaining the most powerful party will control the provider of
dispute resolution, which may create a concern of fairness and prevent a party
from vindicating their rights).
68. Robinson v. J&K Admin. Mgmt. Servs. Inc., No. 15-10360, 2015 U.S 817
F. 3d 193, 198 (5th. Cir. 2016).
69. Section 2 of the FAA, 9. U.S.C § 2.
70. 9 U.S.C. §§ 2, 3. See First Opinions of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514, U.S.
938, 44-45 (1995) (“Courts should not assume that the parties agreed to
arbitrate arbitrability unless there is clear and unmistakable evidence that they
did so.”).
71. David Horton, Arbitration as Delegation, 86 N. Y. U. L. REV. 437, 450
(2011).
72. Id.
73. U.S. Insulation v. Hilro Constr. Co., 146 Ariz. 250, 253, (Ct. App. 1985).
See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 402 (1967)
(“…except where the parties otherwise intend—arbitration clauses as a matter
of federal law are separable from the contract in which they are imbedded.”).
74. Richard C. Reuben, Article, First Options, Consent to Arbitration and the
Demise of Reparability: Restoring Access to Justice for Contracts with
Arbitration Provisions, 56 SMU L. REV. 819, 824 (2003).
75. Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 402.
76. Id. at 402 - 407.
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just the arbitration clause the claim would have gone to the
arbitrator.77
Problems arise when parties do not agree that they previously
submitted themselves to arbitration.78 Parties cannot “be required
to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to
submit.”79 A valid agreement must exist between the parties, and
the dispute must fall “within the substantive scope of that
agreement,” to determine whether the contract submits the parties
to arbitration.80 Therefore, if the arbitration’s enforceability is in
question, a judge decides if the contract compels arbitration, and an
arbitrator has the authority per the contract to decide.81
The U.S. Supreme Court in First Options, stated parties can
defer gateway issues of arbitrability to the arbitrator. However, if
parties do not clearly and unmistakably give deference to the
arbitrator, the court rules on the issue of whether arbitration is
warranted.82 The Sixth Circuit applied this rule in Reed Elevator
and Huffman. Both courts held that questions arising from an
arbitration agreement that do not give deference to either the judge
or the arbitrator, should be delegated to the judge.83 The Third
Circuit in Chesapeake, took a different approach.84 The Third

77. Id.
78. Id. at 943. See S.I. Strong, Does Class Arbitration: “Change the Nature”
of Arbitration? Stolt-Nielsen, AT&T, and A Return to First Principles, 17 HARV.
NEGOTIATION L. REV. 201, 244 (stating consent to an arbitration clause is the
most important element in order to determine who has the authority to
adjudicate the conflict).
79. Richmond Health Facilities v. Nichols, 811 F.3d 192, 195 (6th Cir. 2016)
(quoting AT&T Techs. v. Commc'ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648, (1986)).
80. Zawada v. Uber Techs. Inc., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178582 at *7 (E.D.
Mich. 2016) (quoting Javitch v. First Union Sec., Inc., 315 F.3d 619, 624 (6th
Cir. 2003)). See Totten v. Kellogg Brown & Root, LLC, 152 Supp 3d. 1243, 1249
(C.D. Cal. Aug 7, 2015) (providing federal substantive law usually governs the
enforcement of the arbitration agreement and state substantive law governs the
determination if the contracting parties agreed to arbitrate). Contra Southland
Corporations v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 33 (1984) (“The general rule prescribed by
§ 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act is that arbitration clauses in contracts
involving interstate transactions are enforceable as a matter of federal law…I
believe that exception leaves room for the implementation of certain
substantive state policies that would be undermined by enforcing certain
categories of arbitration clauses.”) (Scalia, A., dissenting).
81. Green Tree Fin. Corp Ala. v. Randolph, 539 U.S. at 451-453 (2000)
(plurality opinion). See Vonda Mallicoat Laughlin, Claims of Unconscionability
of Contract as Subject to Compulsory Arbitration Clause Contain in Contract,
22 A.L.R. 6th 49, 2 (2016) (stating courts hold unconscionability should be
address by the court if the allegations of unconscionability pertain to the
arbitration clause itself while others state all claims of unconscionability should
be referred to the arbitrator).
82 First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995).
83. Reed Elevator, Inc. v. Crockett, 734 F. 3d 594, 599 (6th Cir. 2013);
Huffman v. Hilltop Companies, LLC, 747 F.3d 391, 393-394 (6th Cir. 2014).
84. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC v. Scout Petroleum, LLC, 809 F.3d 746,
760-766 (3rd. Cir. 2016) (“The arbitrator shall have the power to rule on his or
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Circuit held when there is no clear and unmistakable deference to
a court or an arbitrator in the arbitration agreement, arbitrability
is decided by the arbitrator.85
Overall, the question of arbitrability is “an issue for judicial
determination [unless the parties] clearly and unmistakably
provide otherwise.”86 A two-step process is used to determine the
question of arbitrability.87 First, the court must ask whether the
parties agreed to arbitrate, by asking “whether a valid agreement
to arbitrate exists and whether the dispute falls within the
agreement.”88 Second, the court must ask whether federal statute
or policy renders the claims non-arbitrable.89 The party seeking to
avoid arbitration has “the burden of proving that the claims at issue
are unsuitable for arbitration.”90
In deciding if the arbitration clause should be enforced, it is
imperative courts know which contract is being challenged.91 The
U.S. Supreme Court has stated challenges to “the contract as a
whole” are different than “challenges of the agreement to
arbitrate.”92 Thus, an arbitration agreement can be valid and
enforceable even if the underlying contract is invalid and
unenforceable.93 The savings clause makes this situation possible.
The savings clause is an arbitration agreement that can be
invalidated under the FAA.94 The saving clause makes an
arbitration agreement unenforceable through applicable contract
defenses.95
a. Unconscionability
Courts do not uphold arbitration agreements if the court deems
the agreement unconscionable.96 State law governs whether the
her jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence, scope, or
validity of the arbitration agreement or to the arbitrability of any claim or
counterclaim.”) (citation omitted).
85. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, 809 F.3d at 760-766.
86. First Options, 514 U.S. at 943 (internal citations omitted). See Gen.
Motors Corp. v. Pamela Equities Corp., 146 F.3d 242, 247 (5th Cir. 1998)
(stating the question of who decides arbitrability turns upon the parities intent).
87. Dealer v. Computer Servs., Inc. v. Old Colony Motors, 588 F. 3d 884, 886
(5th Cir. 2009).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991).
91. Cole v. Pearson Educ., Inc., No. 10 Civ. 7523 (JFK) (RLE) 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 110603 at *13 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
92. Rent-A-Center, West Inc. v. Jackson, 13- S. Ct. 2772, 2778 (2010).
93. Id.
94. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (stating arbitration agreements can be invalidated “upon
such grounds as exists at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”).
95. AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011).
96. Green Tree Fin. Corp. Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000) (holding
the existence of large arbitration costs could make an arbitration contract
unconscionable if the party cannot vindicate her statutory right).
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agreement is unconscionable or enforceable because contracts are
state-law principles that do not comport with the text of the FAA.97
Many states apply standard contract law, which hold contracts
must be knowingly entered into by both parties and no party is
coerced into the contract.98 California contract law states a contract
can be unconscionable when a party with more power writes the
contract in their favor.99 An unconscionable contract must be both
procedurally and substantively unconscionable.100 Courts use a
sliding scale test to determine a contract’s unconscionability by
analyzing the procedural process of the contract’s formation. On one
side of the scale, courts consider the circumstances surrounding the
contract’s adoption and whether the signer had been induced to sign
the contract.101 On the other side of the scale, courts look at the
contract’s harsh or unreasonable substantive terms.102 In
determining whether the terms of the contract are harsh or
unreasonable, courts inquire into the following factors: (1) when the
contract was created and in what commercial setting; (2) the
contract’s purpose; and (3) how the effect the contract and its’
provisions affect the parties.103
3. Procedural Unconscionability
A contract is procedurally unconscionable if the stronger party
during contract formation deprived the weaker party of
“meaningful choice such as through the use of ‘oppression’ or
‘surprise.’”104 Oppression occurs when unequal bargaining power
exists and one party has no authority to negotiate the terms in the

97. Doctor’s Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 685 (1996) (“states may
regulate contracts, including arbitration clauses, under general contract law
principles and they may invalidate an arbitration clause ‘upon such grounds as
exists at law or in equity from the revocation of any contract.”) (quoting 9 U.S.C.
§ 2) (emphasis added).
98. Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford
Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989).
99. Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC, 61 Cal. 4th 899, at 910-12 (2015)
(explaining the doctrine of unconscionability has both a procedural effect
dealing with the oppression or surprise with unequal bargaining power and a
substantive effect dealing with harsh or one-sided results).
100. Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychare Services, Inc., 24 Cal. 4th
83, 114 (2000) (stating the contract is unconscionable if the contract has a
degree of procedurally and substantively unconscionability).
101. Sanchez, 489 U.S. at 910 (quoting Sonic II, 57 Cal. 4th at 1133).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 909 (emphasis added) (concluding the presence of an opt-out
provision forecloses a finding of procedural unconscionability). See Arrigo v.
Blue Fish Commodities, Inc., 408 Fed. Appz. 480, 481 (2nd Cir. 2011) (stating
in employee agreements, provisions forcing an employee to choose between
signing the agreement or losing his or her jobs has been deemed to be
unconscionable).
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contract.105 Furthermore, a surprise occur in the contract when a
stronger party disguises the disputed terms of the contract,106
resulting in the weaker party being unaware of the contract’s
language.107 Therefore, a contract is unconscionable when a party
is not aware, the party does not understand the contract’s
disadvantageous terms or the party felt pressured to not opt-out of
the contract.108 Courts, in considering whether or not a party felt
pressured to not opt-out of the arbitration agreement, look at the
pressure that the financially weaker party felt and compare the
pressure the powerful party to accept the contract.109 The
arbitration agreement, however, is not unconscionable if the optclause is conspicuous and grants the party a reasonable opt-out
period.110
4. Substantive Unconscionability
In order to prove an agreement is substantively
unconscionable, the moving party must argue one of the following
factors: (1) the contract lacked mutuality; (2) a party has or had the
ability to unilaterally modify the terms of the agreement; (3) the
provisions in the agreement are so unfair either one of the parties
to the arbitration are unable to vindicate their rights in an arbitral
forum.111 In employment contracts, any waiver that is placed in an
arbitration agreement the employee must have known such waiver
was within the arbitration agreement.112 Provisions in the
arbitration clause are substantively unconscionable if a clause
mandates the parties split the cost of arbitration, or the weaker
party is required to bear the administrative fees they cannot
afford.113 As a result, the weaker party who cannot afford
arbitration is not able to vindicate their rights.114

105. A&M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 487 (1982).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Gentry v. Super. Co., 42 Cal 4th 443, 472 (2007) (holding an opt- out
clause may make an arbitration clause unconscionable depending on the time
period the parties had to opt-out). See Kilgore. v. KeyBank, N.A., 718 F. 3d 1052,
1059 (9th Cir. 2013) (stating the inclusion of an opt-out provision does not make
a contract unconscionable if the provision is buried within the contract).
109. Gentry, 42 Cal 4th at 472.
110. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Ahmed, 283 F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir. 2002)
(stating the combination of the arbitration opt-out clause and the formation of
the contract together made the arbitration agreement not unconscionable).
111. Amendariz v. Foundation Health Psychare Services, Inc., 24 Cal 4th
83, 103 (2000).
112. Id. at 99. (explaining statutory rights explained under the Fair
Employment and Housing Act are not waivable because the rights listed in the
Act were created for a public purpose).
113. Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2310-11.
114. Green Tree Fin. Corp. Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. at 90 (2000)
(explaining the effective vindication of rights doctrine does not require a finding
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5. Class Arbitrations
Supreme Court Justice, Alito, in Stolt-Nielsen, stated class
arbitration “changes the nature of arbitration.”115 Class
arbitrations resemble judicial class actions but have unique arbitral
procedures.116 Class arbitrations restrict the arbitral class to
individuals that are party to the relevant agreement.117 Parties
usually invoke class arbitrations when several individuals seek
relief on a representative basis instead of each individual filing
separately.118 Class arbitrations are treated similarly when
attempting to determine whether the parties agreed to class
arbitration. Courts look to the terms of the parties’ agreement.119 If
the agreement is unclear to whether the parties agreed to class
arbitration, courts or arbitrators (depending on the jurisdiction)
consider a list of factors.120 The most important factor is whether a
class arbitration would affect the parties’ remedies.121
While class arbitrations appeal to consumers and employees,
corporations avoid judicial class actions and class arbitrations.122
Since the U.S. Supreme Court in Concepcion upheld the
enforceability of class waivers in arbitration agreements,
corporations now insert class waivers into their agreements to
disallow any class from being certified.123 Class waivers, however,
of procedural unconscionability).
115. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animal Feeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1775
(2010) (quoting Alito, J.,) (holding consolidated parties could bring their suit as
a class action to be heard in arbitration). See Strong, supra note 78 at 247 (2012)
(discussing the unique attributes of class arbitration).
116. Id. at 207.
117. See American Arbitration Association, Supplementary Rules for Class
Arbitrations (effective Oct 8. 2003), available at www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=21963.
See Fed R. Civ P. 23 (citing the rule applicable to class actions).
118. Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 130 S. Ct. 1757, 1775 (2010) (stating a large amount
in dispute cannot change the nature of the arbitration).
119. Id. at 1773-1774.
120. Gary Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 1746, 2084 (2009)
See Julian S.M. Lew et al., Comparative International Commercial Arbitration,
16-18 (2003) (stating arbitrators rely on three principles when an agreement is
silent to class arbitration: (1) the principle of good faith; (2) the principle of
effective interpretation; (3) and the principle of interpretation contra
proferentem (meaning “against the offeror”). The arbitrator should not rely on
on the principle for strict interpretation).
121. See, e.g., In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig., 634 F. 3d 187, 199 (2d Cir.
2011) (holding a class waiver which disallowing plaintiffs from pursuing class
arbitration to be unenforceable).
122. Carideo v. Deli., Inc., 706 F. Sup 2d 1122, 1127 (W.D. Wash. 2010). See
Strong, supra note 78 at 225 (stating the “subjective intent of one party cannot
control the interpretation of the contract.”).
123. AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1751 (2011) (stating
class arbitration can be inconsistent with the FAA). Contra Discovery Bank v.
Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1108 (2005) (holding class waivers in arbitration
agreements were unenforceable). See Mitsubishi Motors Corp v. Soler Chrysler-
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are only enforceable if it can be evidenced that both parties
demonstrated an intent to agree with the class waiver. Therefore,
the parties’ consent to the class waivers must be explicit.124 A court
may find consent to be implicit based on the rule of law.125 The U.S.
Supreme Court has not clearly indicated whether the interpretation
of class waivers and class arbitration should be a question for the
arbitrator or for the judge.126
Another factor affecting class arbitration are opt-out clauses.127
Opt-out clauses allow parties to choose whether or not they wish to
participate in the arbitration.128 Courts have questioned the
conscionability of opt-out clauses.129 Most courts argue opt-out
clauses must have the following factors: opt-out clauses must not be
ambiguous, nor hidden in the contract, and must allow a reasonable
amount of time to exercise the opt-out option.130
6.

Class Arbitration and Agency Law Conflict with the FAA

Class arbitrations become more convoluted when a certified
class brings a claim pursuant to a state or federal labor law.131 This
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625-26 (1985) (explained by Justice Scalia when
characterizing his argument for construing the “enforcement of arbitration
agreements according to the terms so as to facilitate streamlined proceedings.”).
See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748 (quoting Scalia, J.) (contrasting, however,
Justice Breyer stating there is nothing in the FAA nor is there any precedent to
support reading the statute.). See also Strong, supra note 78 at 227 (explaining
a number of state courts have dismissed class waivers despite the Supreme
Court’s ruling leading several legislators to propose amendments to the FAA).
124. Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 130 S. Ct. at 1768 (stating that when parties have
not “reached any [explicit agreement on the issue of class arbitration, the
arbitrators’ proper task [is] to identify the rule of law that governs in that
situation.”) (citation omitted).
125. Id.
126. Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2067 (2013). See
Opalinski v. Robert Half Interional, Inc., 761 F.3d 326, 331 (3rd Cir. 326)
(holding the question of arbitrability is for judicial determination). Contra
Emplrs Ins. Co. v. Century Indem. Co., 443 F. 3d 573, 681 (7th Cir. 2006)
(stating in two different cases the question of consolidating arbitration is not a
question of arbitrability but is a procedural issue for the arbitrator to decide).
Accord Discovery Bank, 113 P. 3d at 1117 (stating an arbitrator should decide
whether or not an arbitration agreement prohibits class action relief).
127. Strong, supra note 78 at 223 (stating “the niceties of the opt-in/opt-out
process mean that those unnamed parties to class arbitrations who choose to
participate in the proceedings can be said to have effectively ratified the choice
of arbitrators.”).
128. Id.
129. Cullinane v. Uber Techs. Inc., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89540 at *6 (D.
Mas. July 20, 2016).
130. Meyer v. Kalanick, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99921 at *22 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
131. Weston, supra note 12 at 104 (discussing how strict enforcement of
arbitration clauses can limit parties’ access to administrative remedies they
usually would be entitled too). See Lisa B Bingham, Control Over DisputeSystem Design and Mandatory Commercial Arbitration, 67 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROS. 221, 221 (2004) (stating arbitration is no longer presumably voluntary for
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section will discuss the FAA disputed preemption over the National
Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”), which is the governing body over
the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) and PAGA labor
claims.132 The FAA and administrative agencies at the federal,
state, and local level have all been empowered by congressional
statutes to implement rules and procedures.133 The NLRA have the
duty of “managing, implementing and enforcing federal policy.”134
State and local agencies and regulations “address matters of local
concern, including labor and employment, education, law
enforcement, public health, agriculture, processional licensure,
transportation, public assistance, commerce and revenue.”135 An
example of a state labor regulation is PAGA. The state in a PAGA
action uses labor codes to protect aggrieved employees against
employers.136
a. NLRA
The NLRB was created by and operates under the NLRA.
Section 7 § 157 of the National Labor Relations Act provides,
“Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join,
or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection.”137 The second section, 8(a) of the NLRA,
29 U.S.C. § 158(a) states: “It shall be unfair labor practice for an
employer… to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the
exercise of the right guaranteed in section 157.”138 Congress
articulated in the NLRA that it is the policy of the United States to
encourage collective bargaining agreements and protect workers’
freedom to associate.139 Therefore, under the NLRA, contracts

it has now become forced or imposed by the stronger party onto the weaker).
132. See infra Section II, iv, a, b, c (discussing arbitrations effect on the
EEOC, NLRA, and PAGA).
133. Weston, supra note 12 at 114. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 206-207 (approved
9/30/16) (establishing a national minimum hourly wage, standard for overtime
pay, child labor laws, and recordkeeping). See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Accord
National Labor Relations Act., 49 Stat 449 (1935) (explaining the Act’s purpose
is too aid and protect the lowest paid employees who lack bargaining power to
secure rights themselves). See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (2012).
134. Weston, supra note 12 at 114.
135. Id. See Cal. State Bd. Of Optometry v. FTC, 910 F. 2d 976,979-80 (S.C.
Cir 1990) (explaining the Tenth Amendments limits to Congress ability to
override state sovereignty).
136. Weston, supra note 12 at 123.
137. Section 7, National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.S. § 157. See Lewis,
823 F. 3d at 1154 (stating the plain language of the NLRA does not reveal
Congress’s intent to exclude class representative, and collective legal
proceedings from NLRA protection).
138. Section 8(a), National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.S. § 158(a).
139. Section 7, National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.S. § 157.
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rescinding employees’ rights is unenforceable because the purpose
of the NLRA is to “improve terms and conditions of employment” by
using administrative and judicial forums.140 However, problems
arise when the NLRA conflicts with the FAA.
The FAA provides that any written contract “evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or
transaction…shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.”141 This is known as the Saving Clause of the FAA.142
Thus, it has been interpreted that the FAA should preempt the
NLRA because of Congress’s express intent to motivate the use of
arbitration.143
The NLRB in Horton I favored the NLRA over the FAA, stating
federal labor laws cannot be restricted.144 Thus, employers cannot
prevent employees from filing “joining, class or collective claims
addressing the wages, hours or other working conditions against
employer in any forum arbitral or judicial.”145 The Fifth Circuit
reversed Horton I in Horton II, by diminishing the NLRB’s
authority to enforce and interpret the NLRA.146 The Fifth Circuit
stated “even explicit procedure for collective action will not override
the FAA.”147 Even if the petitioners brought claims to the NLRB and
then to court, any language in the employment agreement that
requires employees to bring their claims to arbitration for relief
must be adhered too.148 The Fifth Circuit gave Chevron deference
to the NLRB and their ruling in Horton I.149 The Fifth Circuit held
140. Eastex Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 565-566 (1978); See NLRB v. Jones
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937) (stating that Congress enacted the
NLRA because of their knowledge an employee would be helpless when dealing
with an employer without a union that would give laborers opportunity).
141. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq.
142. 9 U.S.C. § 2; See Iskanian v. CLS Transp. LA., LLC, 327 P. 3d 129 (Cal.
2014); CompuCredit Corp v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95 (2012) (stating that the
FAA prevails unless another statute contains congressional intent to the
contrary or it falls within the saving clause).
143. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974).
144. Horton I, 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184 at *1 (Jan. 3, 2012) rev’d D.R. Horton
II, 757 F. 3d 344 (holding the arbitration agreement violated employee’s right
that are protected under the NLRA).
145. Id.
146. Weston, supra note 12 at 128.
147. D.R. Horton II, 757 F.3d 344, 360 (5th Cir. 2013) (stating arbitration
agreements cannot be unenforceable because of the parties unequal bargaining
power). Contra Murphy Oil USA Inc., and Hobson, 361 NLRB No. 72 (N.L.R.B
Oct. 28, 2014) (holding the same conclusion as Horton I, which stated
arbitration agreements containing class and collective action waivers violate
the NLRA).
148. D.R. Horton II, 757 F.3d at 360.
149. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 847
n.9 (1984) (holding that courts can give deference to administrative agencies
holdings when setting judicial precedent).
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that an arbitration agreement that disallows an employee from
filing a lawsuit could be a potential violation of the NLRA.150
However, the Court ultimately chose to favor the FAA’s broad
jurisdiction over federal labor law.151
Other federal circuit courts including the Ninth, Eighth, and
Second Circuits, have also rejected the Board’s decision by following
the Fifth Circuit’s lead in Horton II by upholding class waivers in
arbitration agreements.152 These circuits have held that the NLRA
has no language within its’ four corners to evidence Congress clearly
intended to allow the NLRA to preempt arbitration and permit
employees to file class proceedings.153 These circuits have stated
that the FAA unlike the NLRA has an expressed congressional
intent that the FAA should preempt administrative law in all
circumstances.154 Since the Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in AT&T
v. Conception, the above mentioned circuits have ruled in favor of
FAA preemption where the Supreme Court held that Congress
intended the FAA to favor arbitration and its ability to further
judicial economy and expedite the resolution of legal claims.155
The Supreme Court in Conception revealed that the FAA
allows employers to restrict employees from pursuing class
proceedings to avoid arbitration.156 Other Supreme Court cases
have ruled similarly.157 In Moses H. Cone Mm’l Hosp. v. Mercury
Constr. Corp., the Court stated the FAA’s purpose is to “place an
arbitration agreement upon the same footing as other contracts and
to overrule the judiciary’s longstanding refusal to enforce
agreements to arbitration.158 Furthermore, CompuCredit Corp.
states that an “arbitration” provision in a “contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce shall be valid, irrevocable and
150. D.R. Horton II, 757 F.3d at 360 (referring to D.R. Horton I, 357 N.L.R.B.
2277 (2012)).
151. Id.
152. Weston, supra note 12 at 128. See Richards v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 734
F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2013) (stating the Board’s decision in Horton I conflicts
with the explicit pronouncements of the Supreme Court’s policy to enforce the
FAA); Cellular Sales of Mo., LLC v. NLRB, 824 F.3d 772, 776 (8th Cir. 2013)
(holding the arbitration agreement does not violate the NLRA);
Johnmohammadi v. Bloomingdale's, Inc., 755 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2014);
Paulsen ex rel. NLRB v. Remington Lodging & Hospitality, LLC 773 F.3d 462
(2nd Cir. 2014); NLRB v. Alt. Entm’t Inc., No. 16-1385, 2017 WL 2297620 at
*18 (6th Cir. 2017) (stating that the savings clause saves inferior status like
state law or federal common law; it does not save “other federal statutes enacted
by the same sovereign.”).
153. Id.
154. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
155. Id. (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2).
156. Id.
157. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614
(1983); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985); CompuCredit
Corp., 565 U.S. at 98; Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,
460 U.S. 1 (1983).
158. Id. at 24.
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enforceable.”159 As a result, according to these cases, the FAA has a
broad scope that can trump employees’ rights under the NLRA in
bringing class proceedings.160
The Seventh Circuit took a unanimous stance against the other
federal circuits.161 The case involved a healthcare software
company, Epic Systems, and an employee, Jacob Lewis. During his
employment, Lewis received an email containing an arbitration
agreement.162 The arbitration agreement asked employees to review
the terms and acknowledge the acceptance of the agreement by
clicking two buttons.163 Epic presented employees no option to
decline the agreement if they wished to remain employed.164 Thus,
Lewis accepted the agreement.165 However, allegedly, and
unbeknownst to him, he had agreed to bring all wage-and-hour
claims through arbitration; in effect, Lewis waived all future rights
to participate “in or receive money or any other relief from class,
collective, or representative proceeding.” The agreement also
included a clause revealing that if the “Waiver of Class and
Collective Claims” was deemed unenforceable, “any claim brought
on a class, collective, or representative action must be filed in a
court of competent jurisdiction,” and if they continued to work for
Epic without signing the agreement, Epic would presume they had
accepted.166 In 2015, Lewis sued Epic in federal court on behalf of a
class of other employees in violation of the employees’ right to
engage in “concerted activities” under section 7 of the NLRA. Epic
moved to dismiss the complaint, asserting that Lewis waived his
right to bring any claim in court as a participant of a class action.167
After losing at the district court, Lewis appealed to the Seventh
Circuit.168 The Seventh Circuit unanimously agreed with Lewis and
NLRB’s holding in Horton I.169 The Seventh Circuit held that
“employees shall have the right…to engage in concerted activities

159. CompuCredit Corp., 565 U.S. at 98.
160. Id. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 614; Dean, 470 U.S. at 213;
Mercury Constr.Corp., 460 U.S. at 1.
161. Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2014) rev’d 584 U.S.
____ (2018); See Thomas Cavenagh, SCOTUS Tackles Arbitration Issue…Again,
LAWREVIEW. JMLS (April 18th 2018) https://lawreview.jmls.edu/scotus-tacklesarbitration-issue-again/.
162. Lewis, 823 F. 3d at 1151.
163. Brief for Respondent at 2, Epic Systems Corporation v. Jacob Lewis (No.
16285) (August 2017).
164. Id. at 3.
165. Id.
166. Lewis, 823 F. 3d at 1151.
167. Brief for Respondent at 3, Epic Systems Corporation v. Jacob Lewis (No.
16285) (August 2017).
168. Id.
169. Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F. 3d at 1152 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing to
Horton I that the NLRB “form its earliest days,” held that “employer-imposed,
individual agreements that purport to restrict Section 7 rights” are
unenforceable.” 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184 at *5, 357 N.L.R.B. 2277 at 2280 (2012)).
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for the purpose of…mutual aid or protraction,” and that Section 8
enforces Section 7 of the NLRA “unconditionally by deeming that it
shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer…to interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the right guaranteed in Section
7.”170 The Seventh Circuit also held that contracts
“stipulat[ing]…the renunciation by the employees of rights
guaranteed by the [NLRA]” are unlawful and may be declared to be
unenforceable by the Board.”171 The Seventh Circuit criticized the
Fifth Circuit in Horton II for failing to recognize that the Supreme
Court has previously explained that Section 7’s protections cover
employees’ “seek[ing] to improve working conditions through
administrative and judicial forums.”172
While the Seventh Circuit in Epic Systems has ruled that
Section 7 and Section 8 in the NLRA can supersede an arbitration
clause,173 the U.S. Supreme Court took a different position on this
issue.174 In oral arguments, both Justice Kagen and Ginsberg
favored upholding the NLRA over the FAA, while Chief Justice
Roberts had a great concern that ruling in favor of the NLRA could
disrupt millions of current employment agreements currently in
effect.175 The holding came down in favor of the FAA and
employers.176
The majority held that the Federal Arbitration Act’s policy favoring
enforcement of arbitration agreements trumps Section 7 of the
National Labor Relations Act, which confers on employees the right
to engage in “concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.” In contrast, Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s dissent argued that the rights conferred by
Section 7 take precedence over the FAA and prohibit enforcement of
agreements calling for one-on-one arbitration of employment
disputes…The linchpin of her dissent was her contention that filing
wage-and-hour claims on a class or collective basis is among the
employee “concerted activities” protected by Section 7 of the
NLRA.177

Those in favor of the majority’s holding argue that Ginsberg’s
“contention is not plausible, given that collective actions of that sort
were unknown when the NLRA was adopted.”178 While the

170. Id. (citing to 29 U.S.C. § 157).
171. Id. (citing to Nat’l Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350, 365 (1940)).
172. Brief for Respondent at 10, Epic Systems Corporation v. Jacob Lewis
(No. 16285) (August 2017) (citing to Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 565566 (1978).
173. Cavenagh, supra note 161.
174. Weston, supra note 12 at 128.
175. Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, No. 16-285, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018).
176. Richard Samp, Symposium: Justice Ginsburg’s Anachronistic Dissent
in Epic Systems Runs Afoul of the Rules Enabling Act, SCTOUSBLOG.COM (May
2, 2018).
177. Id.
178. Id.
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definition of protected “concerted activities” can be expanded over
time, the adoption of federal procedural rules should be not be used
a vehicle for expanding substantive rights.179 Thus, for Ginsberg’s
dissent to be applicable, Congress must conclude that employees’
right to engage in “concerted activities” should include class-action
rights and preempt the FAA.180
b. PAGA
State labor claims also have been in dispute with the FAA.181
The California Supreme Court in Iskanian held the FAA does not
preempt PAGA when employees seek representative action.182
Iskanian stated the FAA applies to private disputes; and if the
arbitration agreement expresses no clear and manifest intent to
preempt state labor laws, then a state can exert their broad police
powers.183 The Ninth Circuit in Sakkab, ruling similarly, stated the
FAA preempts class action waivers but not PAGA claims.184 The
Ninth Circuit explained that, because class actions are brought on
behalf of private citizens and PAGA claims are brought on behalf of
the state, PAGA claims cannot be preempted by the FAA.185 To
determine if the FAA preempts state laws, courts examines what
the burden on the arbitrator would be to apply state labor law
procedures, and if the basic attributes of arbitration would be
undermined. If the courts determine there is a high burden on the
arbitrator and the attributes of arbitration are not disrupted, the
court will apply the state labor statute and not the FAA.186
However, “when parties agree to arbitrate all questions arising
under a contract, the FAA supersedes state laws” in all judicial and
administrative forums.187 The “carve out” of PAGA claims remains
debated, and the U.S. Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue.188
Advocates of PAGA, believe that if the FAA did preempt Labor
claims, preemption would “disable one of the primary mechanisms
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Iskanian v. CLS Transp. LA, LLC, 327 P.3d at 133 (Cal. 2014) (holding
employees may seek recovery for a large group under PAGA and not be forced
into arbitration). Contra Sakkab v. Luxottica Retail N. Am., Inc., No. 13-55184,
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 17071, at *3 (9th Cir. 28, 2015) (holding PAGA waivers
do not conflict with the FAA, and can be heard in arbitration).
183. Iskanian, 327 P.3d at 133.
184. Sakkab, No. 13-55184, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 17071 at *3.
185. Id.
186. AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748-53 (2011)
(explaining the rule in Discover Bank preempted the FAA because the state law
would require “arbitrators to apply rigorous, time consuming, and formal
procedures.”) (citation omitted).
187. Weston, supra note 12 (citing Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 359
(2008)).
188. Weston, supra note 12 at 123.
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for enforcing the Labor Codes.”189

III. UBER LITIGATION: MOHAMED V. UBER TECHS., INC.
The Ninth Circuit has set a strong precedent in upholding an
arbitration clause disallowing Uber drivers from pursuing collective
relief.190 Later, this comment will analyze the Ninth Circuit’s
decision in great detail; for now, a brief background on the case will
be provided.191 Then, this section will discuss other Uber cases and
whether or not they ruled similarly to the Ninth Circuit. To begin,
the facts in Mohamed v. Uber Techs. Inc., are provided for a
background:192
Plaintiff Abdul Mohamed began driving for Uber’s black car service
in Boston in 2012, and for Uber X around October 2014… Like all
Uber drivers, Mohamed used a smartphone to access the Uber
application while driving, which enabled him to pick up customers.
In late July 2013, Mohamed was required to agree to two new
contracts with Uber (the “Software License and Online Services
Agreement” and the “Driver Addendum”; jointly, the “2013
Agreement”) before he was allowed to sign in to the application. The
2013 Agreement provided that it was governed by California law. It
included an arbitration provision requiring Uber drivers to submit to
arbitration to resolve most disputes with the company. It also
included a provision requiring drivers to waive their right to bring
disputes as a class action, a collective action, or a private attorney
general representative action. Drivers could opt out of arbitration by
delivering notice of their intent to opt out to Uber within 30 days
either in person or by overnight delivery service. Mohamed accepted
the agreements and did not opt out.
Nearly a year later, in June 2014, Uber released an updated version
of the Software License and Online Services Agreement and the
Driver Addendum (jointly, the “2014 Agreement”). The 2014
Agreement also provided that it was governed by California law. It
included an updated arbitration provision with an easier opt-out
procedure that enabled drivers to opt out via e-mail as well as in
person or by delivery service. It also included a provision requiring
all disputes with the company “to be resolved only by an arbitrator
through final and binding arbitration on an individual basis only, and
not by way of court or jury trial, or by way of class, collective, or
representative action.” Mohamed accepted these agreements and did
189. Hernandez v. DMSI Staffing LLC., No. C-14-1531 EMC, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12824, *27 (N.D. Cal. Feb 3, 2015) (quoting Chin, J., concurring) (stating
Congress did not manifest clear intent the FAA should trump California’s police
powers).
190. Mohamed v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 15-16178, 15-16181, 15-16250, 2016
U.S. App. LEXIS 16413 at *5 (2015).
191. See infra Section III, A (analyzing why the Ninth Circuit incorrectly
ruled in favor of Uber).
192. See infra Section II, V, a (comparing other courts’ decisions to the Ninth
Circuits).
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not opt out…
In late October 2014, shortly after he began driving for Uber x,
Mohamed’s access to the app was cut off due to negative information
on his consumer credit report, effectively terminating his ability to
drive for Uber. Plaintiff-Appellant Ronald Gillette began driving for
Uber in the San Francisco Bay Area in March 2013. Like Mohamed,
he was required to agree to the 2013 Agreement before signing into
the Uber application in late July 2013.
Also like Mohamed, he did not opt out. In April 2014, Gillette’s access
to the app was cut off because of negative information on his
consumer credit report. This effectively terminated his relationship
with Uber. On November 24, 2014, Mohamed filed a class action in
the Northern District of California against Uber, Rasier, and Hirease,
an independent company that conducted background checks…Two
days later, on November 26, 2014, Gillette filed a separate lawsuit
against Uber, also in the Northern District of California. Gillette
alleged that …Uber had misclassified him and other employees as
independent contractors in violation of California’s PAGA statute.
Uber moved to compel arbitration in both lawsuits, arguing that
Gillette was bound by the arbitration provision in the 2013
Agreement and Mohamed by the arbitration provision in the 2014
Agreement. The district court denied both motions, Mohamed, 109 F.
Supp. 3d at 1190, and Uber now appeals.193

Furthermore, in the Northern District of California, Judge
Chen held that the delegation clause in the agreement did not
provide that the drivers had clear and unmistakable intent to waive
their right to have a court determine arbitrability questions.”194
Judge Chen deemed the arbitration clause unconscionable because
drivers would have to pay “exorbitant fees just to arbitrate
arbitrability; fees which drivers would not need to pay to litigate
arbitrability in court.”195 Judge Chen also held that the PAGA
claims were viable because states have an interest in protecting the
drivers.196
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part,
and remanded the case.197 The Ninth Circuit held the District Court
“improperly assumed the authority to decide whether the
193. Mohamed, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 16413 at *5-8.
194. Id. at 125 (Chen E.,) quoted in Mohamed, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75299
at *19 (emphasis added).
195. Id. (determining the drivers’ acceptance of the arbitration clause
through the app made the clickwrap agreement unconscionable).
196. See Weston, supra note 12 at 125 (discussing Judge Chen’s decision in
Mohamed).
197. Mohamed, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 16413 at *33. See Joel Rosenblatt &
Edvard Petterson, Uber Wants Court Stamp on Arbitration Win as Message to
Drivers,
BLOOMBERG
LAW
(Jan.
23,
2017)
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-01-23/uber-wants-court-stamp-onarbitration-win-as-message-to-drivers (stating the 9th Circuit’s decision gives
Uber a win in a lawsuit covering 385,000 drivers in California and
Massachusetts claiming to be employees and not independent contractors).
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arbitration agreements were enforceable,” as questions of
arbitrability should be delegated to the arbitrator except in claims
arising under PAGA.198 The Ninth Circuit also stated the delegation
provision was not unconscionable and the class waiver in the
arbitration agreement did not hinder the parties from vindicating
their rights.199 Finally, the Ninth Circuit held all disputes involving
PAGA under 2014 Agreement should go to the arbitrator, and all
disputes under jurisdiction of the 2013 Agreement should go to the
court.200
1. Uber Litigation: Are Other Courts Following the Ninth
Circuit’s Lead?
Recently, Uber’s arbitration agreements has butted heads with
the NLRB leaving courts the question as to whether their
arbitration agreements violate the NLRA.201 The drivers argue that
Uber’s arbitration agreements are unlawful because of the board’s
decision in Horton I.202 The NLRB in December 2015 sought the
subpoenas to determine “how Uber screens, hires, disciplines, and
terminates drivers, and how much control the company has over
their day-to-day work.”203 The NLRB also issued the subpoenas, but
Uber did not comply because of other pending litigation.204 A U.S.
Magistrate Judge, Sallie Kim in San Francisco, however, held that
Mohamed and other subsequent litigation has no impact on the
NLRB’s authority to investigate complaints.205
While Uber’s feat with the NLRB may not be over in the
future, the Ninth Circuit has set a strong precedent that the
“delegation provision properly delegated questions of arbitrability
to the arbitrator.”206 Courts within the Seventh Circuit’s
198. Mohamed, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 16413 at *12.
199. Id. at 15-22.
200. Id. at 23-26 (stating the PAGA waiver in the 2013 Agreement “is
several from the remainder of the arbitration agreement.”) (citation omitted).
201. Daniel Wiessner, Judge Says Appeals by Uber Drivers Do Not Impact
NLRB Prob., REUTERS LEGAL (Dec. 16, 2016), www.reuters.com/article/laboruber-idUSL1N1EB0EE (last visited Mar. 12, 2017).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. See NLRB v. Uber Techs. Inc., 2016 LEXIS 111052, at *1 (stating the
NLRB has the right to gain information from Uber to determine if drivers are
protected under the NLRA).
205. Wiessner, supra note 201.
206. Zawada v. Uber Techs. Inc., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178582 at *13 (E.D.
Mich. Dec. 2016) (citing Congdon v. Uber Techs., Inc., , 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
170138 at *4, (N.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2016)); Micheletti v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 151001 (RCL), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137318 at *1 (W.D. Tex. 2016); Lee v. Uber
Techs., No. 15 C 11756, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140171 at *1 (N.D. Ill. 2016);
Bruster v. Uber Tech., Inc., No. 15-cv-2653, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67523 at *1
(N.D. Ohio 2016); Suarez v. Uber Tech., Inc., No. 8:16-cv-166-T-30MAP, 2016
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59241 at *1 (M.D. Fla. 2016); Varon v. Uber Tech., Inc., No.
MJG-15-3650, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58421 at *1 (D. Md. 2016); Sena v. Uber
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jurisdiction have also followed Uber’s lead in upholding all
authority should be delegated to the arbitrator; however, the courts
have not outright ruled against drivers bringing a collective
action.207 Instead, the U.S. District Court in Gunn stated “the
question of enforceability of the collective action waiver must be
resolved by the arbitrator.”208 In contrast, since the Ninth Circuit’s
ruling, few courts have held that Uber’s arbitration agreement did
“not clearly and specifically indicate the parties’ intent to have the
arbitrator decide if class-action claims are authorized.”209
Judge Rakoff and Judge John E. Stelle, United States District
Court Judges for the Middle District of Florida, have ruled
favorably with Judge Chen in the Northern District of California.210
Judge Rakoff in Meyer, held Uber’s arbitration clause
unconscionable because consumers to the agreement had no
realistic power to negotiate or contest the clause.211 Judge Rakoff
explained Uber has used two types of user agreements: browsewrap
agreements and clickwrap agreements.212 In furtherance, clickwrap
or “click-through” agreements require a website users to click “on
an ‘I agree’ box after being presented with a list of terms and
conditions of use; while browsewrap agreements are agreements
“where the website’s terms and condition of use are generally posted
on the website via a hyperlink at the bottom of the screen.”213 Also,
browsewrap is different than clickwrap because “a browsewrap
agreement does not require the user to manifest assent to the terms
and conditions expressly…a party instead gives his assent simply

Tech. Inc., No. CV-15-02418, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47141 at*1(D. Ariz. 2016)
(ruling similarly to the Ninth Circuit).
207. Lee, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140171 at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 2016). See Gunn
v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 1:16-cv-01668-SEB-MJD, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11393
at *10 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 2017) (granting Uber’s motion to compel arbitration but
staying the proceedings until the arbitrator decides the question of the collective
action waiver).
208. Gunn, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11393. at *10.
209. Marc v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 16-cv-579-FtM-99MRM, 2016 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 171942 at *7 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 2016).
210. Meyer v. Kalanick, No. 15 Civ. 9796, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99921 at
*1 (2016) vacated and remanded Meyer v. Uber Techs., Inc., 868 F.3d 66, 2017
U.S. App. LEXIS 15497 (2d Cir. N.Y., Aug. 17, 2017).
211. Id. at 7-8; see Alison Frankel, Judge Rakoff’s Soapbox: On Uber,
Arbitration and Fair Play, REUTERS (Aug. 1, 2016), www.blogs.reuters.com/
alison-frankel/2016/08/01/judge-rakoffs-soapbox-on-uber-arbitration-and-fairplay/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2017) (explaining why U.S. District Judge Jed Rakoff
denied Uber’s motion to “dismiss allegations that Kalanick is the orchestrator
of a vast price-fixing conspiracy involving hundreds and thousands of Uber
drivers.”) (citation omitted).
212. Meyer, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99921 at *16-20 See Nguyen v. Barnes &
Noble Inc., 763 F. 3d 1171, 1177 (9th Cir. 2014) (stating in a click wrap
agreement the signor must have actual knowledge of the terms of the
agreement).
213. Nguyen, 763 F. 3d at 1176.
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by using the website.”214
Judge Rakoff, in Meyer, explained that browsewrap
agreements have been abandoned because the agreements do not
provide adequate awareness to the party assenting to the contract;
yet clickwarp agreements are enforceable even when the agreement
disallows class arbitration. 215 Judge Rakoff held in Meyer, that
Uber’s contract is analogous to browsewrap agreements or “sign-in
wrap” contracts, which make the contracts unconscionable.216
Judge Rakoff takes a strong position against both browswrap
and clickwrap agreements. He explains that one’s right to a jury is
a fundamental right guaranteed by the constitution.217
This most precious and fundamental right can be waived only if the
waiver is knowing and voluntary, with the courts’ indulging every
reasonable presumption against waiver’. But in the world of the
Internet, ordinary consumers are deemed to have regularly waived
this right, and indeed, to have given up their access to the courts
altogether, because they supposedly agreed to lengthy ‘terms and
conditions’ that the consumer had no realistic power to negotiate or
contest and often were not even aware of.218

In contrast, Uber’s lawyers in a brief to the Second Circuit
stated that Judge Rakoff’s opinion formed an “erroneous
conclusion” by concluding plaintiff did not assent to the arbitration
provisions, and the district court’s opinion is “out of step” with the
overwhelming
weight
of authority
enforcing
electronic
agreements.219 Judge Rakoff stayed the antitrust class action until
the Second Circuit interprets the arbitration clause and decides
whether complainants are compelled to redress their claims in
arbitration.220 On appeal, both parties addressed the question of
whether courts, in the new world of app-based technology, should
take a new outlook on what assent to contract entails. Ultimately,
the Second Circuit vacated Judge Rakoff’s holding.221 The Second
Circuit held that “Uber App provided reasonably conspicuous notice
of the Terms of Service as a matter of California law, and plaintiff's
assent to arbitration was unambiguous in light of the objectively
reasonable notice of the terms.”222 The court remanded to the
214. Id. (citing Hines v. Overstock.com, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 2d 362, 366-67
(E.D.N.Y. 2009)) (citation and quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original).
215. Meyer, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99921 at *20-23.
216. Id. at 34-35.
217. Frankel, supra note 211 at *1(discussing Judge Rakoff’s opinion in
Meyer).
218. Meyer, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99921 at *1 (quoting Rakoff, J.S.).
219. See Frankel, supra note 211 at 2 (quoting Uber’s lawyers in Uber’s brief
to the Second Circuit).
220. Meyer, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114844 at *1.
221. Meyer v. Uber Techs., Inc., 868 F.3d 66 (2nd Cir. 2017).
222. Daniel W. Staples, Uber Wins Appeal on Embedded Terms of Service
Link, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE (August 18, 2017) (explaining the Second
Circuit’s decision in Meyer).
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district court to consider whether defendants have waived their
rights to arbitration and for any further proceedings.”223

III. ANALYZING THE APPLICATION OF PRECEDENT AND
ADDRESSING ARBITRABILITY TO THE 9TH CIRCUIT’S
OPINION IN MOHAMMED V. UBER TECHNOLOGIES.
First, this section analyzes why the delegation clause in Uber’s
arbitration agreement is ambiguous,224 and demonstrates why the
arbitration agreement is unclear as to whether PAGA claims will be
heard in front of a judge or arbitrator.225 Second, this section
demonstrates that if the PAGA waiver is found to be unenforceable,
the waiver should not be severed from the arbitration agreement,
because the entire arbitration agreement should be become
invalid.226 Third, it argues why Uber’s arbitration agreement is
unconscionable.227 Fourth, it explains why Uber’s disallowance of
class actions, PAGA claims, and administrative labor claims is a
violation of the vindication of rights doctrine.228

A. The Delegation Clause: Who Decides the Judge or
the Arbitrator?
The U.S. Supreme Court in Southland Corp., held the FAA
preempted a California statute prohibiting arbitration clauses.
Since that decision companies have seized the opportunity to embed
contract restrictions into arbitration clauses.229 As a result, drafters
of arbitration clauses have a found a new way “to strip judges of
their traditional role as bulwarks against overreaching arbitration
clauses.”230 Uber has followed this trend by placing specific
language within their arbitration clauses to protect their company
from litigating class, collective actions, and representative actions
in court.231 While Uber drivers have pushed back against these
arbitration clauses, no success has surmounted.232 Courts have
followed the trend to rule in favor of companies to compel all

223. Id.
224. Infra Section III, A.
225. Infra Section III, B.
226. Infra Section III, B.
227. Infra Section III, C.
228. Infra Section III, D.
229. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465. U.S. 1, 10-11 (1984) (explaining the
FAA favors a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements). See D.R.
Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 2277 at 456 (stating Companies have capitalized on
the federal policy favoring arbitration agreements).
230. Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 468.
231. Mohamed v. Uber Tech. Inc., 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 16413 at *15 (9th
Cir. 2016).
232. See supra note 6 (listing cases where drivers have sued Uber).

468

The John Marshall Law Review

[51:205

disputes into arbitration.233
The Ninth Circuit stated in the 2013 arbitration clause, “the
delegation provisions clearly and unmistakably delegate the
question of arbitrability to the arbitrator for all claims except
challenges to the class, collective, and representative actions waiver
in the 2013 agreement.”234 The Court stated that pursuant to the
U.S. Supreme Court in Rent-A-Center, the agreement must be
enforced according to its’ terms, granting the arbitrator
determination of “arbitrability as to all claims except those specially
exempted.”235 The Court contends a presumption exists in
arbitration agreements that courts will decide questions of
arbitrability.236 The 2013 arbitration agreement states:
Except as it otherwise provides, this Arbitration Provision is intended
to apply to the resolution of disputes that otherwise would be resolved
in a court of law or before a forum other than arbitration. This
Arbitration Provision requires all such disputes to be resolved only
by an arbitrator through final and binding arbitration and not by way
of court or jury trial.237
Such disputes include without limitation disputes arising out of or
relating to interpretation or application of this Arbitration Provision,
including the enforceability, revocability or validity of the Arbitration
Provision or any portion of the Arbitration Provision.238

The Ninth Circuit stated the 2014 Agreement avoided the
delegation problem by specifically requiring all questions of
arbitrability to go to the arbitrator because the agreements
provides, “all such matters shall be decided by an arbitrator and not
by a court or judge.”239 The Ninth Circuit interpreted the venue
provisions the same as the provision states “any disputes, actions,
claims, or causes of action arising out of or in connection with this
Agreement or the Uber Service Software,” (the 2013 and 2014
Agreement[s]) “shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the
state and federal courts located in the City and County of San
Francisco.”240 The Ninth Circuit explained the venue provision’s
purpose was to “identify the venue of any other claims that are not
233. Id.
234. Mohamed, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 16413 at *15. See Oracle Am., Inc. v.
Myriad Grp. A.G., 724 F.3d 1069, 1072 (9th Cir. 2013) (stating “in issue is for
judicial determination unless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide
otherwise.”) (citation omitted).
235. Mohamed, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 16413 at *15; Rent-A-Center West
Inc., v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. at 2778 (2010).
236. Oracle Am., 724 F.3d at 1072.
237. Mohamed, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 16413 at *9 n. 3.
238. Id.
239. Id. at *10 (comparing the language here to that at issue in Momot v
Mastro, which held the language clearly and unmistakably indicated the intent
for the arbitrator to decide threshold questions of arbitrability). Momot v.
Mastro, 652 F. 3d 982, 988 (9th Cir. 2011).
240. Mohamed, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 16413 at *13.
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covered by the arbitration agreement.”241
First, it must be addressed if the 2013 and 2014 Agreements
clearly and unmistakably delegate the question of arbitrability to
the arbitrator.242 Then, it must be determined whether there is a
contract delegating the issue of arbitrability to the arbitrator to
decide if the contract is enforceable. In analyzing the 2013 and 2014
Agreements, it is ambiguous as to whether the drivers clearly and
unmistakably delegated the contract to the arbitrator as often the
signors to these types of employment contracts do not read the fine
printed terms.243
Recently courts have taken the approach to not consider
whether the contract had been read and entered into on a smart
phone app.244 Courts presume mutual assent is present.245
However, by that presumption courts neglect to consider basic
contract principles as to whether both parties assented to the
contract. Courts along with the Ninth Circuit should recognize
whether the parties assented by writing, orally, or by conduct.246
Also, courts in determining mutual assent, must investigate if the
drafter of the contract made the adverse party aware of the contract
terms, and if the adverse party assented to the contract.247 If the
parties agreed or consented to arbitrate, the arbitration agreement
cannot be ruled unconscionable.248 As a result, parties must make
their intent to delegate to the judge or the arbitrator unmistakably
clear in the arbitration agreement to avoid making a mutual
mistake.249
Here, the Ninth Circuit held this same rule stating that the
parties clearly delegated all issues to the arbitrator.250 Yet, the
Ninth Circuit does not recognize arbitration agreements as
241. Id. at *14.
242. Rent-A-Center, 561 U.S. at 69-70 (stating “parties can agree to arbitrate
gateway questions of arbitrability, such as whether parties have agreed to
arbitrate or whether their agreement cover a particular controversy”). See Brief
of Respondent-Appellee at 8, J&K Admin. V. Robinson, No. 16-95 (September
21, 2016) (explaining the significant language contained in the delegation
clause determines whether the issue should be decided by the arbitrator or the
judge).
243. See Rent-A-Center, 581 F. 3d at 917. See generally D.R. Horton, Inc.,
357 N.L.R.B. 2277 at 467. But see Awuah v. Coverall N. Am., Inc., 554 F. 3d 7,
12-13 (1st Cir. 2009) (stating the courts must consider fairness when analyzing
delegation clauses).
244. Meyer v. Kalanick, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99921 at *18 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
245. Id.
246. Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 89 Cal. Rptr, 2d 540, 551 (Cal. App. 1999).
247. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 19(2) (1981).
248. Cullinane v. Uber Techs. Inc., 2016, U.S. Dist. 88808 at *10 (D. Mas.
July 2016).
249. Aimian v. Yahoo., Inc., 83 Mass. App. Ct. 565, 573-574 (2013) (stating
in online contract analysis is the same around the country, contracts will be
adhered too as long as they have been reasonably entered into).
250. Mohamed v. Uber Tech. Inc., 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 16413 at *11 (9th
Cir. 2016).
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contracts.251 The Ninth Circuit did not address if drivers manifested
consent to the arbitration agreement to summit their claims to the
arbitrator.252 The California District Court in Commercial Factors
Corp., argues:
Clarity and conspicuousness of arbitration terms are important in
securing informed assent. If the party wishes to bind in writing
another to an agreement to arbitrate future disputes, such purpose
should be accomplished in a way that each party to the arrangement
will fully and clearly comprehend that the agreement to arbitrate
exists and binds the parties thereto.253

The language of the 2013 Agreement and its delegation clause
does not meet the clear and ambiguous standard.254 The
agreement’s language is vague and generalized, and does not
directly state whether the issue of arbitrability should go to the
arbitrator. The Ninth Circuit prematurely infers the parties
intended for all disputes to go to the arbitrator.255 In contrast, the
2014 Agreement is clearer than the 2013 Agreement.256 The 2014
Agreement states “all such matters shall be decided by an
Arbitrator and not by a court or judge.”257
The plain language in the 2013 and 2014 Agreements appear
to delegate the issue of arbitrability to the arbitrator; yet, ambiguity
arises within the delegation clause when coupled with the language
contained in the agreements venue clauses. The clauses reveal that
state and federal courts in San Francisco will have “exclusive
jurisdiction” over “any disputes, actions, claims or causes of action
arising out of or in connection with this agreement.”258 The Ninth
Circuit, when interpreting the 2013 and 2014 clauses, did not
believe the venue provision created ambiguity in the arbitration

251. Specht v. Netscape Communs. Corp., 306 F. 3d 17, 29 (2d. 2002) (citing
to Windsor Mills, Inc. v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 101 Cal. Rptr. 350, 351 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1972)).
252. Specht, 306 F. 3d at 29 ("In California, a party's intent to contract is
judged objectively, by the party's outward manifestation of consent.") (citing
Cedars Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Mid-West Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 118 F. Supp. 2d 1002,
1008 (C.D. Cal. 2000)).
253. Commercial Factors Corp. v. Kurtzman Bros, 280 P.2d 146, 147-48
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1955) (internal quotation marks omitted).
254. Appellee’s Joint Response Brief, supra note 254 at 72, Mohamed v. Uber
Tech; Gillette v. Uber Tech., Mohamed v. Hirease, No. 15-16178, 15-16181, 1516250 (9th Cir. Jan. 11, 2016).
255. Appellant’s Joint Opening Brief, at 36, Mohamed v. Uber Tech; Gillette
v. Uber Tech., Mohamed v. Hirease, No. 15-16178, 15-16181, 15-16250 (9th Cir.
Oct. 21, 2015) (citing the district court stating, “Plaintiffs do not appear to
contend that the language of the delegation clauses itself is ambiguous and such
an argument would be a tough sell.”) (quoting Chen E.) (citation omitted).
256. Mohamed v. Uber Tech. Inc., 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 16413 at *9 n. 3
(9th Cir. 2016).
257. Id.
258. Appellee’s Joint Response Brief, supra note 254 at 73 (citing the venue
provision contained within the 2013 agreement).
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agreement.259 The Ninth Circuit stated the purpose of the venue
selection clause was to inform the parties of the proper venue to
bring suit when attempting to enforce the arbitration agreement.260
The Ninth Circuit contended the venue clause made the parties
aware all complaints should be filed in San Francisco when bringing
a claim.261 However, the language of the venue clause is not clear
why the drivers should file in San Francisco if their claims are
already delegated to arbitration.262 This question creates ambiguity
in the contract.
First, the language in the 2013 and 2014 Agreements stipulate
state and federal courts in San Francisco have “exclusive
jurisdiction” over “any disputes, actions, claims of causes of
action.”263 The language in the delegation clause in the 2013 and
2014 Agreement contradicts the language in the venue provision.264
This contradiction creates a discrepancy in the contract as to
whether the parties intended the arbitration provision to be decided
by the court or the arbitrator if all complaints should be filed in San
Francisco.265 This discrepancy is problematic because in order to
delegate all issues to the arbitrator there must be “clear, consistent
and unambiguous” language in the agreement.266 Therefore, “where
one contractual provision indicates that the enforceability of an
arbitration provision is to be decided by the arbitrator, but another
provision” conflicts with the provision and could be unenforceable,
the contract then is not a clear and unmistakable delegation to the
arbitrator.267 If the parties were providing a venue clause for the
purpose of enforcing an arbitration award, the drafter of the
259. Mohamed, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 16413 at *9. See Appellee’s Joint
Response Brief, supra note 254 at 73 (citing the venue provision contained
within the 2013 agreement).
260. Mohamed, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 16413 at *13.
261. Id.
262. Id. at *9.
263. Id.
264. Id. See Appellee’s Joint Response Brief, supra note 254 at 73 (citing the
venue provision contained within the 2013 agreement; explaining both the 2013
and 2014 agreement “state that “any” disputes, which would include those
regarding arbitrability, shall be heard in court, which contradicts the later
arbitration clauses, stating that “without limitation,” “disputes arising out of or
relating to interpretation or application of this Arbitration Provision” shall be
subject to arbitration.”).
265. Id.
266. Rent-A-Center West, Inc., v. Jackson, 561 U.S. at 69 (2010).
267. Ajamian v. CantorCO2, LP., 203 Cal. App. 4th 771, 787 (2012) (holding
“[W]here one contractual provision indicates that the enforceability of an
arbitration provision is to be decided by the arbitrator, but another provision
indicates that the court might also find provision in the contract unenforceable,
there is no clear and unmistakable delegation of authority to the arbitrator.”)
(citation omitted). See Rent-A-Center, 561 U.S. at 69 n. 1 (explaining the
delegation of arbitrability must be “clear, consistent and unambiguous” so no
questions arise of who should decide the issue of arbitrability). See generally
First Opinions of Chicago, Inc., v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. at 944 (1995).
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agreements should have made that intent specific.
Second, both the 2013 and 2014 Agreements give courts the
authority to strike-out invalid or unenforceable language, while still
capable of enforcing the remaining contract.268 Third, the 2013
Agreement grants only a court to rule on the unenforceability or
unconscionability of the PAGA waiver, not an arbitrator.269 These
provisions create ambiguity in the arbitration agreements’
delegation clauses, as the 2013 Agreement also gives the court
“exclusive jurisdiction” to rule on “any claims.270 Ambiguity arises
because the court has jurisdiction to strike invalid and
unenforceable language in the contract, but also allows a court to
rule on the PAGA waiver as conflicting to who has the authority.271
As a result, it is unclear as to whether the parties’ inferred intent
was to actually delegate all issues to the arbitrator.272
Although the Ninth Circuit doesn’t analyze the specific words
of the venue provision, it infers Uber was the venue provision in the
arbitration agreement as a guide to where the agreement will be
enforced.273 The Ninth Circuit in Momot explained that any
language delegating authority to the arbitrator, or to the court can
be proved by the parties’ intent.274 The Ninth Circuit stated both
the 2013 and 2014 Agreements delegated authority to the
arbitrators to decide issues relating to “enforceability, revocability,
or validity of the Arbitration provision or any portion of the
Arbitration Provision… and the agreements also indicate the
parties’ intent for the parties to decide the threshold question of
arbitrability.”275 The Ninth Circuit relies on this language to affirm
their reasoning that the parties’ intended to delegate all issues to
the arbitrator.276
Case law conflict with the Ninth Circuit’s contractual
interpretation.277 A judge may not determine the enforceability of
an arbitration clause, unless the moving party argues the entire

268. Appellant’s Joint Opening Brief, supra note 255 at 36 (citing language
of the 2013 and 2014 agreement that state: “If any provision of the Agreement
is held to be invalid or unenforceable, such provision shall be struck and the
remaining provision shall be enforced.”).
269. Mohamed v. Uber Tech. Inc., 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 16413 at *9 (9th
Cir. 2016).
270. Id.
271. Rent-A-Center, 561 U.S. at 69 n. 1.
272. Id. at *9-15. See generally Appellant’s Joint Opening Brief, supra note
255 at 76.
273. Mohamed, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 16413 at *13.
274. Momot v. Mastro, 652 F. 3d 982, 988 (9th Cir. 2011) (explaining Justice
Stevens dissenting opinion in Rent-A-Center).
275. Mohamed, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 16413 at *12.
276. Id.
277. See Rent-A-Center, 130 S. Ct. at 2779 (explaining the determination of
the validity of a delegation clause is separate from the entirety of the arbitration
agreement).
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arbitration agreement is unfair.278
Thus, the parties must
challenge the entire arbitration agreement in order to challenge the
validity of the delegation clause.279 An arbitrator decides the
validity of the delegation clause.280 Any doubts concerning the scope
of arbitrable issues, or the existence and validity of the arbitration
clause is decided by the arbitrator.281 The purpose of this rule is to
not allow an arbitration to rule on his own jurisdiction.282
Here, the drivers questioned the validity of the entire
arbitration agreement and not the validity of the specific delegation
clause.283 The Ninth Circuit inferred the purpose of the venue
provision was to allow the parties to dispute the delegation of the
arbitration.284 However, when looking at the specific language of the
venue provision it is ambiguous as to whether the parties intended
the provision for this purpose.285 If the parties wanted to delegate
the authority to an arbitrator to decide issues relating to
“enforceability, revocability or validity” of the arbitration
agreement, the parties would not need a venue provision. The venue
provision would serve no use because both the validity of the
arbitration agreement and the validity of the delegation clause
would be given to the arbitrator to decide.286 If the parties included
the venue provision to serve as a delegation clause for parties who
seek to argue validity in court, the parties should have explicitly
labeled the clause as such or by making the language of the clause
bold and unambiguous.287

278. D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 2277 at 467.
279. Rent-A-Center, 130 S. Ct. at 2780.
280. Id.
281. Mitsubishi Motors Corp v. Soler Chysler-Plymouth Inc.,473 U.S. 614,
626 (1985).
282. Id. See Awuah v. Coverall N. Am. Inc., 554 F. 3d at 10-11 (1st Cir. 2009)
(stating once an arbitration clause is broad enough to encompass the issues in
dispute and the parties can be said to have intended to agree to arbitration then
the court must compel arbitration).
283. Mohamed v. Uber Tech. Inc., 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 16413 at *14 (9th
Cir. 2016).
284. Id. at *9. See Appellee’s Joint Response Brief, supra note 254 at 73
(citing the venue provision contained within the 2013 agreement) (explaining
both the 2013 and 2014 agreement “state that “any” disputes, which would
include those regarding arbitrability, shall be heard in court, which contradicts
the later arbitration clauses, stating that “without limitation,” “disputes arising
out of or relating to interpretation or application of this Arbitration Provision”
shall be subject to arbitration.”).
285. Id. at *13.
286. D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 2277 at 467. See Rent-A-Center West,
Inc., v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. at 2777-2778 (2010) (explaining how delegation
clauses involve the separability doctrine in determining if the parties are
arguing the fairness of the delegation clause or the entire arbitration
agreement).
287. See Horton, at 482-486 (explaining how private parties through the use
of arbitration class are able to make their own procedural rule-making to
protect their own interests).

474

The John Marshall Law Review

[51:205

It does not appear the drafter of the 2013 and 2014 Agreements
intended the venue provision to be a delegation clause. Instead, the
Ninth Circuit interprets the delegation clause in the 2013
Agreement to be the following: “this Arbitration Provision requires
all such disputes to be resolved only by an arbitrator through final
and binding arbitration and not by way of court or jury trial.”288 The
Ninth Circuit cites the delegation clause in the 2014 Agreement to
be the following: “all such matters shall be decided by an Arbitrator
and not by a court or judge as the delegation clause.”289 The two
provisions in the 2013 and 2014 Agreements do not clearly
designate this language as the delegation clause.290
Conclusively, the Ninth Circuit in deciphering the intent of the
parties in delegating the question of arbitrability to the arbitrator,
did not “measure assent by an objective standard.”291 The Ninth
Circuit did not take into account what the drivers, said, wrote, or
did and the transactional context in which the driver accepted
Uber’s arbitration agreement.292 Uber should not assume that their
drivers, as lay persons, know the effect an arbitration agreement
has in resolving a dispute.293 When applying an objective viewpoint,
as a reasonable prudent driver under the circumstances, it is
evident a driver would not know an arbitration clause existed nor
would a driver know the meaning of the contractual language
contained within an arbitration clause.294
When observing the arbitration clause in its entirety, it is clear
that previous case law regarding the delegation of arbitrability is
complex and many caveats exist. Therefore, arguably these drivers
have no intent in delegating the issue of arbitrability to the
arbitrator. No intent exists because it is unlikely that these drivers
understand the contractual language stated in the 2013 and 2014
Agreements.295 Many Uber drivers have stated they did not read the

288. Mohamed, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 16413 at *9 n. 3.
289. Id.
290. First Opinions of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, at 944 (1995).
See Baker, 159 Cal. App. 4th at 859 (holding a delegation clause to not be “clear
and unmistakable” when the contract both contained a delegation clause to
delegate issues of arbitrability to an arbitrator and a delegation clause for
severances to be determined by an arbitrator or a court) (emphasis added).
291. Specht v. Netscape Communs. Corp., 306 F. 3d at 29 (2d. 2002).
292. Id.
293. Id. at 33 (holding a reasonable and prudent person would not be on
notice of the existence of SmartDownload License when the terms were on
multiple scrollable screens).
294. Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of
Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J.
2804, 2804 (2015) (explaining most individuals are unaware an arbitration
agreement exists in the contract).
295. See Christopher McKinney, Mandatory Arbitration: How American
Employers Opt Out of the Justice System, TEXAS EMPLOYMENT LAW BLOG (last
updated May 20, 2015), www.texasemploymentlawblog.com/main/2015/05/
articles/hr-management/mandatory-arbitration-american-employers-attempt-
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terms of the agreement before accepting and do not understand the
“amount of legalese” contained within the agreement.296 While it is
true that “a party cannot avoid the terms of a contract on the ground
that he or she failed to read it before signing it”297 an exception
applies when the written terms are not called to the attention of the
recipient and are not understood.298 In application to the
circumstances in Mohamed, no reasonable person without prior
knowledge of law could interpret the language of the 2013 and 2014
Agreements. No person could reasonably understand that all issues
arising under the Agreements are subject to arbitration because the
language is not clear and convincing. Thus, the Ninth Circuit
enforced arbitration agreements on drivers without their
knowledge and without mutual assent.

B. The PAGA Waiver’s Delegation, Severability and
Enforceability.
The Ninth Circuit held that when the drivers accepted the
2013 and 2014 Agreements, they waived any right to bring class,
collective and representative action, including PAGA claims either
in court or arbitration.299 However, the language in the 2013
Agreement made an exception to this language stating:
Notwithstanding any other clause contained in this Agreement, any
claim that all or part of the Class Action Waiver, Collective Action
Waiver or Private Attorney General Waiver is invalid, unenforceable,
unconscionable, void or voidable may be determined only by a court
of competent jurisdiction and not by an arbitrator.300

The 2013 Agreement also states:
There will be no right or authority for any dispute to be brought,
heard, or arbitrated as a private attorney general representative
action. The Private Attorney General Waiver shall not be severable
from this Arbitration Provision in any case in which a civil court of
competent jurisdiction finds the Private Attorney General Waiver is
unenforceable.301

The 2014 Agreement cannot be invalidated because the
language clearly designates all waivers to be decided by the
to-opt-out-of-employment-law-protections-for-workers (last visited February 8,
2017) (explaining that “approximately two-thirds of those who have had an
arbitration agreement enforced against them cannot remember seeing anything
about forced arbitration in their Terms of Employment.”).
296. Said, supra note 7.
297. Marin Storage & Trucking, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645, 651 (2001).
298. Id.
299. Mohamed v. Uber Tech. Inc., 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 16413 at *10 (9th
Cir. 2016).
300. Id. at 11. (stating the district court incorrectly held the delegation
clause in the 2013 and 2014 agreements as no clear and unenforceable).
301. Appellee’s Joint Response Brief, supra note 254 at 14.
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arbitrator.302 Thus, the language of the 2014 Agreement disallows
any challenges to the enforceability and severability of PAGA
waiver.303 In contrast, any PAGA claims arising from the 2013
Agreement is for the determination of the district court and not the
arbitrator.304 The 2013 Agreement denotes before the arbitration
agreement in Section 14.1: “if any provision of the Agreement is
held to be invalid or unenforceable, such provision shall be struck
and the remaining provision shall be enforced to the fullest extent
of law.”305 Section 14.3(ix) of the agreement reads: “[e]xcept as
stated in subsection v, above in the event any portion of this
Arbitration Provision is deemed unenforceable, the remainder of
this Arbitration Provision will be enforceable.”306
The Ninth Circuit argued in the 2013 Agreement the PAGA
waiver could be severed from the remainder of the agreement, but
did not invalidate the entire agreement.307 The Ninth Circuit ruled
in accordance with Iskanian. In Iskanian the California Supreme
Court held an employment agreement compelling PAGA’s
protection is enforceable because the FAA does not preempt
PAGA.308 As a result, if employees fail to execute their option to optout of the arbitration clause, employees still cannot be forced to
waive their labor claims under PAGA.309 As a PAGA claim and an
FAA claim are two separate issues, the Ninth Circuit stated the
PAGA waiver if found unenforceable and cannot invalidate the
remainder of the arbitration agreement.310 PAGA claims must be
adjudicated in court and the arbitration clause must be adjudicated
by the arbitrator.311
The plain language of the contract reads that if the PAGA
waiver is deemed to be unenforceable, unconscionable, void or
voidable as determined by the court, then the waivers shall not be
severable from the arbitration agreement.312 Thus, this poorly-

302. Mohamed, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 16413 at *21.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 20 (explaining the district court wrongly concluded the PAGA
waiver unenforceability invalidates the remainder of the arbitration
agreement).
305. Mohamed v. Uber Technologies, 109 F. Supp. 3d 1185, 1225 (N.D. Cal.
2015). (citing the ambiguous language in the 2013 agreement).
306. Mohamed v. Uber Tech. Inc., 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 16413 at *23 (9th
Cir. 2016) (holding the PAGA waiver does not invalidate the arbitration
provision and should not be severed).
307. Id. at *21 (stating while the PAGA waiver under California law was
invalid, it was not severable from the remainder of the 2013 agreement).
308. Iskanian v. CLS Transp. LA, LLC, 327 P. 3d at 129 (Cal. 2014) (stating
public policy does not allow employees to not be able to bring a PAGA action
because policy favors giving employees a choice whether or not to bring a PAGA
action).
309. Mohamed, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 16413 at *21.
310. Id. at *23.
311. Id.
312. Id. at *14 (citing the language of the 2013 arbitration agreement).
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worded provision is confusing and begs the question of whether the
waiver is not severable because it is unenforceable, or the waiver is
not severable because the entire agreement is now enforceable due
to the unenforceable PAGA waiver. Judge Chen, when analyzing
this statute took the latter. He stated, “the plain language of the
contract requires invalidation of the entire arbitration provision
because the PAGA waiver expressly forbids severance.”313 Judge
Chen in his holding ignored the arbitration’s saving clause. Also,
Judge Chen hinted that Section 14.3 (ix) is in contradiction with
this last sentence, creating an ambiguity in the contract.314 In
contract interpretation, when the “general and particular provision
are inconsistent, ‘the particular and specific provision is paramount
to the general provision.”315 Therefore, the specific non-severability
clause in the arbitration agreement can be guiding in determining
PAGA’s severability. However, the Ninth Circuit took the opinion
that the contract provision only stated it is not severable from the
agreement because it is unenforceable, the provision does not state
that this unenforceability renders the rest of the agreement
unenforceable.
Next, if the PAGA provision is held to be unenforceable, it
should invalidate the entire arbitration provision. Here the plain
language of the contract calls for invalidation. The arbitration
agreement states “the Private Attorney General Waiver shall not be
severable from this Arbitration Provision in any case in which a civil
court of competent jurisdiction finds the Private Attorney General
Waiver is unenforceable.”316 The 2013 arbitration agreement gives
the court jurisdiction over PAGA claims.317 Therefore, the court has
the ability to render the entire arbitration agreement invalid
because the PAGA claim is not severable.318 The Ninth Circuit
disregards the language of the agreement by asserting that PAGA’s
enforceability does not invalidate the entire arbitration

313. Mohamed v. Uber Technologies, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1225 (N.D. Cal.
2015) (explaining Uber’s 2013 contract is ambiguous and therefore must be
interpreted against the drafter). See Badie v. Bank of Am., 67 Cal App. 4th 779,
798 (1998) (explaining in California ambiguities in contract are resolved against
the drafter).
314. Appellee’s Joint Response Brief, supra note 254 at 15.
315. Prouty v. Gores Tech. Group, 121 Cal. App. 4th 1225, 1235 (2005)
(citing Cal Civ. Code §3534).
316. Mohamed, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1225 (stating why the PAGA claim is not
severable and could invalidate the entire arbitration agreement).
317. Id.
318. See Chalk v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 560, F. 3d 1087, 1098 (9th Cir. 2009)
(stating when the arbitration agreement includes a provision not allowing
severance courts should invalidate the entire arbitration agreement). See also
Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 3209 (quoting) Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd,
470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985) (discussing how arbitration agreements should be
enforced according to their terms).
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agreement.319 The contract language expressly forbids severance.320
As a result, PAGA’s enforceability effects the entire arbitration
provision.321
However, in contrast, courts do not like to disrupt the parties’
intent by drafting their own contractual provisions.322 Thus, the
Ninth Circuit attempted to follow precedent and interpret to the
best of their ability what the parties’ intent was without
invalidating Uber’s entire employment agreement that remained
binding on hundreds of drivers.323 The Ninth Circuit instead
interpreted that the PAGA waiver was not severable because the
waiver was already not enforceable.324 Therefore, the waiver did not
have an effect on the rest of the employment agreement.325
Ultimately, Uber’s 2013 and 2014 contracts regarding PAGA’s
enforceability should be example to all counsel of how not to draft
an employment agreement containing a FAA provision and a
provision regarding state labor claims. A drafter needs to be clear
about what provisions are severable and what provisions subject
labor disputes to arbitration or litigation.

C. Unconscionability of the Arbitration Agreements
The Ninth Circuit held the 2013 and 2014 arbitration
agreements were not illusory nor procedurally or substantively
unconscionable because the degree of unfairness in the agreements
did not shock the conscience of the court.326 The Ninth Circuit held
an arbitration agreement cannot be considered an adhesive
agreement if the drafter of the contract presents any opportunity to
opt-out of it.327 The Court stated as long as the person signs the
contract, the unfamiliarity of the language cannot be complained of
later.328 The Court did not address the agreements being
substantively unconscionable because the agreements lacked
319. Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 498 F. 3d 976, 986-87
(9th Cir. 2007) (holding an entire arbitration clause can be void if the arbitration
clause contains an unconscionable clause).
320. Mohamed, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1225 (stating the language of the contract
specifically declares “The Private Attorney General Waiver shall not be
severable from this Arbitration Provision.”) (citation omitted).
321. Id.
322. Schneider Moving & Storage Co. v. Robbins, 466 U.S. 364, 370-372
(1984).
323. Mohamed v. Uber Tech. Inc., 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 16413 at *23-34
(9th Cir. 2016).
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Sonic II, 311 P. 3d at 291 (stating unconscionable contracts need to be
substantially more unfair than a bad bargain). See Rent-A-Center West, Inc., v.
Jackson, 561 U.S. at 73 (2010) (holding only arguments regarding the
delegation provision can be considered in an unconscionable challenge).
327. Kilgore v. KeyBank Nat. Ass’n, 718 F. 3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir. 2002).
328. Mohamed, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 16413 at *19.
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procedurally unconscionable elements.329
The Ninth Circuit applied two very broad rules regarding
unconscionability. The Court did not refer too many factors that are
routinely considered by courts in determining procedural
unconscionability, such as the surrounding circumstances occurring
when the parties assented to the contract and the oppressive and/or
surprising language within the agreements.330 A high burden exists
to prove a contract is oppressive because most contracts are drafted
by the party with superior bargaining power.331 Also, no matter how
one-sided a contract is, as stated previously, a court does not want
to disrupt the parties’ intent nor their confidence of freely entering
into contracts.332
Courts consider a contract to be unconscionable when the
contract drafter’s age, literacy, sophistication, intelligence and/or
experiences are superior to those of the non-drafter’s, or when
attributes or circumstances are present that limit an individual’s
“reasonable opportunity to understand the terms of the contract, or
the drafter of the contract sealed material terms in the maze of the
fine print.”333 Other factors courts weigh in determining if the
contract is unconscionable are: whether the contract contains
mutual obligations; whether the contract is one-sided and one party
is faced with more consequences than the other; and whether the
risks between the parties are fair. Here, drivers have stated that
many of these factors are present in Uber’s employment contract.334

329. Id. at *18.
330. Chavarria v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 773 F. 3d 916, 922 (9th Cir. 2012)
(quoting A & M Produce, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 122) (“Oppression addresses the
weaker party’s absence of choice and unequal bargaining power that results in
no real negation…Surprise involves the extent to which the contract clearly
discloses its terms as well as the reasonable expectation of the weaker party.”).
331. Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychare Services, Inc., 24 Cal 4th
at 113 (2000) (stating pre-employment arbitration contracts usually involve
economic pressure exerted by employers and few will refuse a job because of an
arbitration agreement).
332. Gentry v. Superior Court, 42 Cal 4th 443, 469 (2007) (courts presume
contracts have been negotiated by two parties of equal bargaining power).
333. Willy E. Rice, Unconscionable Judicial Disdain for unsophisticated
Consumers and Employees’ Contractual Rights? Legal and Empirical Analyses
of Courts’ Mandatory Arbitration Rulings and the Systematic Erosion of
Procedural and Substantive Unconscionability Defenses Under the Federal
Arbitration Act, 1800-2015, 25 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 143, 147 (2016).
334. Id.
A fairly recent national study suggested that fourteen percent of the U.S.
population is "literally illiterate." They cannot read or write. Also, large
numbers of adults are "functionally illiterate." They cannot read or write
well enough to deal with everyday requirements. More troubling, among
employed adults, 40% are functionally illiterate. And, among adult
consumers, "low literacy" is widespread. Numerous low-literate
consumers cannot read simple label instructions or understand simple
arithmetic or price differentials.
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Uber drivers are accepting employment contracts that are drafted
by sophisticated lawyers who draft the employment contracts to
protect their client, the employer. Lawyers have a duty to protect
their clients; but here, this protection comes at the expense of the
drivers who do not have an opportunity to dispute the terms of the
agreement. As revealed previously, many drivers have stated they
do not understand the contractual language stated in the 2013 and
2014 Agreements, and do not read the agreement because they do
not understand the legalese in the agreement.335 As a result, drivers
do not read the important provisions that are buried in the fine
print of the agreement.336 Most drivers sign the arbitration
agreement through their phone, tablets or computers, where the
print is small, the provision is not highlighted, and is not
explained.337 As a result, drivers do not consider the ramifications
of signing the agreement, especially in an employment context.338
It can be inferred that many Uber drivers do not understand
the opt-out provisions within the 2013 and 2014 Agreements. The
FAA states that parties are not required to arbitrate if one side did
not agree to do so.339 One Uber driver specifically attests that he did
not fully understand the opt-out provision in the contract.340 He felt
if he did opt-out he would not be allowed to drive for Uber.341 The
driver stated he interpreted the agreement as an “it’s my way or the
highway proposition.”342 This same viewpoint has been similarly
held by other drivers fearing if they had chosen to opt-out, Uber
Additionally, and even more troubling, 20% of employed adults are
financially illiterate. Among consumers, financial illiteracy has
increased steadily in the wake of more complex financial services and
instruments. As of this writing, between 28% and 50% of American
consumers are financially illiterate. Id.
335. See Christopher McKinney, Mandatory Arbitration: How American
Employers Opt Out of the Justice System, TEXAS EMPLOYMENT LAW BLOG (last
updated May 20, 2015), www.texasemploymentlawblog.com/main/2015/05/
articles/hr-management/mandatory-arbitration-american-employers-attemptto-opt-out-of-employment-law-protections-for-workers (last visited February 8,
2017) (explaining that “approximately two-thirds of those who have had an
arbitration agreement enforced against them cannot remember seeing anything
about forced arbitration in their Terms of Employment.”).
336. See Abdul Mohammed v. Uber Techs., Inc., 237 F. Supp. 3d. 719, 731
(N.D.E.D 2017) (explaining what a clickwrap agreement is); 2-8 Computer
Contracts § 8.02 (2017) (stating that clickwrap agreements “requires a user to
affirmatively click a box on the website acknowledging awareness of and
requiring a physical manifestation of assent, a user is said to be put on inquiry
notice of the terms assented too.”).
337. Id.
338. Stone and Colvin, supra note 10 (stating many arbitration clauses are
“buried in fine print or incorporated by reference to an obscure and inaccessible
source.”).
339. 9 U.S.C. § 2 cited in Schnabel, 697, F.3d at 118.
340. Said, supra note 7.
341. Id.
342. Id. (quoting Uber driver).
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would retaliate against them.343 These statements evidence two
points. First, Uber drivers did not understand the contractual
language and the purpose of the opt-out clause in the arbitration
agreement. Second, Uber drivers felt they could not opt-out of the
contract without being subjected to retaliation.
The contract offered by Uber, however, appears not to be a
take-it or leave-it contract entirely, because in the 2014 Agreement
Uber does contain an opt-out provision.344 However, like most
arbitration agreements, it can be presumed most drivers did not
know of the existence of the arbitration agreement within the
Uber’s driving contract.345 Today, almost every contract contains an
arbitration clause.346 Yet an employment contract is different, as it
also entails the employers’ assurance that labor laws are
followed.347 Thus, an employee must be aware of what rights they
are signing away when accepting the terms of the employment
contract, for an individual’s employment with a company not only
gives them a job but provides for the employee’s livelihood, wellbeing, family, retirement, and most importantly their means to
survival.348
Here, the agreements contain a degree of unconscionability,
which is usually contained within all employment contracts.349
Courts rarely find provisions in a contract to be a surprise because
they assume every signor to a contract reads the document in its
entirety.350 Case law consistently states the signors inability to
recall the existence of an arbitration agreement does make the
arbitration agreement unconscionable.351 It has been established
343. Id.
344. Mohamed v. Uber Tech. Inc., 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 16413 at *5 (9th
Cir. 2016).
345. Stone and Colvin, supra note 10.
346. Id.
347. Miriam A. Cherry, Working For Virtually Minimum Wage: Applying the
Fair Labor Standards Act in Cyberspace, 60 ALA. L. REV. 1077, 1080 (2014)
(explaining technology and its impact on employment discrimination laws).
348. Id. (“The challenges associated with reconciling virtual work with
traditional labor and employment law doctrines are numerous”). See Willy E.
Rice, Article, Unconscionable Judicial Disdain for unsophisticated Consumers
and Employees’ Contractual Rights? Legal and Empirical Analyses of Courts’
Mandatory Arbitration Rulings and the Systematic Erosion of Procedural and
Substantive Unconscionability Defenses Under the Federal Arbitration Act,
1800-2015, 25 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 143, 147 (2016) (More importantly, when
compared to more powerful and sophisticated employers, merchants and
lenders, functionally and financially illiterate employees and consumers are
disproportionately more likely to be unsophisticated or "legally
unsophisticated.").
349. See Id. (explaining why Individuals are an “inferior status” to
employers in employment agreements).
350. Commercial Factors Corp. v. Kurtzman Bros., 280 P.2d at 47-48 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1955).
351. Blau v. AT&T Mobility, C-11-00541-CRB, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 217,
at *4-5. See Bekele, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104921 at *25 (stating in regards to
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that one who signs a written agreement is bound by its terms
whether or not he understands the language of it.352 A clickwrap
agreement entered into by clicking “I agree” only presents a
minimal amount of unconscionability.353 Courts assume by hitting
“I agree” the reader has reasonable notice of the terms of the
agreement and read it through its entirety.354 The language of the
arbitration clause also does not have to be in the heading, nor does
it have to be capitalized or bolded although from a practice
standpoint it is highly suggested.355 However, a limited amount of
courts hold that a copy of the arbitration rules must be included in
the agreement. Rules also can be accessed through the use of a
hyperlink which helps the contract from being procedurally
unconscionable.356 This hyperlink to the terms of the arbitration
cannot be tucked away in an obscure corner on the app or website.357
Since online agreements existence, courts have debated
whether browsewrap and clickwrap agreements allow for a “mutual
manifestation of assent.”358 Today, in our technological world, basic
contract principles get overlooked by courts.359 The validity of the
contract as to whether the parties have knowledge of the terms
within the four corners of the document is never investigated.360
Scholars of law believe these types of contracts are contracts of
adhesion because a party cannot actually assent to an offer unless
procedural conscionability, Lyft did not have an obligation to highlight the
arbitration clause in the contract).
352. Awuah v. Coverall N. Am., Inc., 703 F. 3d 36, 44 (1st. Cir. 2009). Cited
in Lowen v. Lyft., Inc., No. 15-cv-01159-EDL, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123131 at
*19 (N.D. Cal Sept. 15, 2015) (explaining a reasonable user who cared to pursue
the issues in the Agreement would read the agreement in its entirety whether
even if it appears on the 8th or 9th page of the agreement).
353. Hodsdon v. DirectTV, LLC, No. C. 12-02827 JSW, 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 160638 at 5* (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2012) (stating all contracts contain some
element of adhesion). See Cullinane v. Uber Techs. Inc., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
89540, at *6 (D. Mas. July 2016) (stating clickwrap agreements as long as they
aren’t browsewrap agreements usually provide signors with reasonably terms).
354. Awuah, 703 F. 3d at 44 (1st Cir. 2009).
355. Cullinane, 2016 U.S. Dist. 89540 at *6 (explaining the “Terms of
Service & Privacy Policy” appeared in bold white letters as the “done button”
did that user clicked to register). But see Meyer v. Kalanick, 2016 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 99921 at *7 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
356. Haisha Corp v. Sprint Solutions Inc., No. 14CV2773 FPC MDD, 2015
U.S. LEXIS 5579 at *8 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2015) (“based on federal caselaw and
state law rules of contract interpretation, incorporation by reference of the
arbitration rules is sufficient to excuse attachment of the arbitration rules as
long as the rules are easily accessible and plaintiff has the means and capacity
to retrieve them.”).
357. Meyer, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99921 at *7.
358. Specht v. Netscape Communs. Corp, 306 F.3d 17, 29 (2d. 2002) (stating
mutual assent as the “touchstone” of a binding contract).
359. Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1149 (7th Cir. 1997).
360. Id. See Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in
Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1177 (1983) (explaining the seven
conditions valid contracts of adhesion typically meet).
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that party knows of the offer’s existence.361
In Uber’s arbitration agreements, it is rare drivers know of the
existence of the arbitration agreement and understand it.362
Specifically, a driver, who graduated from UC Berkeley, stated he
did not understand the arbitration in it is entirety, nor did he care
to understand the terms of the agreement because of its complex
language.363 The driver stated “Of course, I do not have a lot of
interest in reading a 10-point type on a cell phone I didn’t want to
have to use a magnifying glass.”364 This driver’s statement
demonstrates that even a college educated man did not understand
the convoluted language of the arbitration agreement. The
statement also evidences the opt-out provision was not as visible as
Uber claims it to be. Thus, hinting a degree of unconscionability in
the arbitration agreement.
In Meyer, the court considered whether the plaintiff had
“[r]easonably conspicuous notice of the existence of contract terms
and unambiguous manifestation of assent to those terms.”365 The
plaintiff in Meyer, unlike the plaintiffs in Mohamed, did not have to
click on the “I Agree” icon in the contract.366 Also, unlike in
Cullinane, where the contract language had been clearly
delineated, the contracting language here was small and obscure.367
As a result, the court found the plaintiff in Meyer did not have
reasonable conspicuous notice of Uber’s agreement, because it
cannot be assumed that the “reasonable (non-lawyer) smartphone

361. Schnabel v. Trilegiant Corp., 697 F.3d 110, 121 (2d Cir. 2012). See
Resnik, supra note 259 at 2804 (stating “although hundreds of millions
of customers and employees are obliged to use arbitration as their remedy,
almost none do so—rendering arbitration not a vindication but an
unconstitutional evisceration of statutory and common law rights.”).
362. Christopher McKinney, Mandatory Arbitration: How American
Employers Opt Out of the Justice System, Texas Employment Law Blog (last
updated May 20, 2015), www.texasemploymentlawblog.com/main/2015/05/
articles/hr-management/mandatory-arbitration-american-employers-attemptto-opt-out-of-employment-law-protections-for-workers (last visited February 8,
2017).
363. Said, supra note 7.
364. Id. (quoting Uber driver).
365. Id. at *21 (quoting Specht, 306 F. 3d at 35).
366. Meyer, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99921 at *28 (stating “I agree” is a
feature courts have repeatedly made note of in declining to find a legal contract).
Contra Mohamed v. Uber Technologies, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1197 (N.D. Cal. 2015)
(“Gillette, like other Uber drivers, used a smartphone to access the Uber
application while working as an Uber driver.”) See Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble,
763 F. 3d 1171, 1176 (9th Cir. 2014) (“an individual may still be said to have
assented to an electronic agreement if ‘a reasonably prudent person user’ would
have been put on ‘inquiry notice of the terms of the contract.”).
367. Meyer, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99921 at *28. See Cullinane v. Uber
Techs. Inc., 2016 U.S. Dist. 89540 at *6 (D. Mas. July 2016) (“Clickwrap’
agreements are more readily enforceable, since they “permit courts to infer that
the user was at least on inquiry notice of the terms of the agreement, and has
outwardly manifesting consent by clicking a box.”) (citation omitted).
Judith
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user is aware of the likely contents of “Terms of Service,” especially
when placed directly alongside “Private Policy.”368
The Seventh Circuit in Sgouros, ruled similarly, stating a court
cannot presume that a person who clicks on a box on a computer
screen has notice of all contents on the agreement. For example, the
user in order to read all the terms of the contract must scroll all the
way through the link.369 The Eastern District of New York in
Berkson, explained the hyperlink to the “Terms of Service & Privacy
Policy” was not prominently displayed on Uber’s registration screen
because the design, location, and small font of the terms is not
obvious to the available user.370 The Berkson court also stated if the
agreement or website does not prompt a party to review the terms
and conditions, then it does not give reasonable notice of the terms
and conditions.371
These cases demonstrate the importance of the placement of
an arbitration clause and the clauses bolded language in order to
provide the reader with reasonable notice. This gives the reader an
opportunity to read the terms before pushing the “I agree” button.372
Online agreements have created a new problem in ensuring the
“integrity and credibility” of electronic bargaining.373 As proven by
the opinion in Mohamed, courts have been reluctant to recognize
current case law even though previous precedent inadequately
addresses the current issues in the new age of contracts.374
Arguably, however, if a signor of the contract is relinquishing a
right to jury, the signor needs to be made aware of an arbitration
clause because without awareness the contract lacks a
manifestation of mutual assent, a basic principle in contract
368. Meyer, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99921 at *31-32.
369. Sgouros v. TransUnion Corp., 817 F. 3d 1029, 1035 (7th Cir. 2016).
370. Berkson v. Gogo LLC., 97 F. Supp. 3d 359, 404 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (stating
the terms and use location within the contract must be reasonably placed, so a
signor would be aware of its location) See Long v. Provide Commerce, Inc., 245
Cal. App. 4th 855, 126 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016) (explaining the checkout flow should
be laid out in an order to make the signor aware of express acceptance of the
contracting party’s rules and regulations).
371. Hines v. Overstock.com, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 2d 362, 367 (E.D.N.Y. 2009),
aff'd, 380 F. App'x 22 (2d Cir. 2010).
372. Meyer, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99921 at *34 (stating “There is a real
risk here that Uber’s registration screen ‘made joining Uber fast and simple and
made it appear-falsely-that being a [user] imposed virtually no burden on the
consumer besides payment”) (quoting Schnabel v. Tirlegiant Corp., 697 F. 3d,
110, 127-28) (2d Cir. 2012).
373. See Specht v. Netscape Communs. Corp., 306 F. 3d at 30 (2d. 2002)
(finding the plaintiffs did not assent to an agreement containing a mandatory
arbitration clause because plaintiffs did not have adequate notice).
374. Mohamed v. Uber Tech. Inc., 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 16413 at *16 (9th
Cir. 2016). See Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d at 1175 (9th Cir. 2014)
(citing “while new commerce on the internet has exposed courts to many new
situations, it has not fundamentally changes the principles of contract.”)
(quoting Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F. 3d 393, 403 (2d Cir. 2004).
(stating contracts need mutual manifestation of assent).

2018]

Uber’s Arbitration Trickery

485

formation.375
Next, while the Ninth Circuit did not address substantive
unconscionability, the court did address the fee splitting provision
in the contract.376 Initially, the 2013 and 2014 Agreements required
drivers to split the cost of arbitration with Uber. The drivers argued
this provision precluded them from effectively vindicating their
rights.377 The court stated Uber’s recent commitment to pay the full
costs of arbitration, thus, rending the vindication of rights doctrine
not applicable.378 Today, drivers no longer have an argument
regarding the exceedingly high price to arbitrate.379
The 2013 and 2014 Agreements state only Uber can modify the
terms of the contract. Therefore, if modifications are made without
Uber drivers’ consent, the contract creates a degree of
unconscionability because only Uber possesses the unilateral power
to modify contractual terms.380 It is determined the contract is
substantively unconscionable when the employee is not able to
negotiate the terms of her contract.381 A counter argument,
however, is that if a unilateral modification provision imposes a
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the contract is not
unconscionable.382 The Ninth Circuit in Mohamed declared Uber’s
opt-out provision gave drivers an opportunity to decide whether or
not he wants to be subject to arbitration, thus eliminating a degree
of unconscionability.383

375. See Schnabel v. Trilegiant Corp., 697, F.3d at 119 (2d. 2012) (explaining
electronic contracts are usually not read by consumers, and as a result,
consumers are clicking away their contractual rights).
376. Mohamed, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 16413 at *16.
377. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. at 2010 (explaining the effective
vindication of rights doctrine: “a means to invalidate, on public policy grounds
arbitration agreements that “operate…as a prospective waiver of a party’s right
to pursue statutory remedies.”) (internally quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp v.
Soler Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 n. 19 *1985).
378. Mohamed, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 16413 at *19.
379. Id. (stating the costs of arbitration in this may case may exceed $7,000
per day).
380. Appellee’s Joint Response Brief, supra note 254 at 53 (revealing the
language of both Agreements citing “Uber reserves the right to modify the terms
and conditions of this Agreement at any time, effective upon publishing an
updated version of this agreement at http://www.uber.com or on the software.”)
(citation omitted).
381. Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F. 3d 1165, 1179 (9th Cir. 2003).
382. Ashbey v. Archstone Prop Mgmt., Inc., No. 12-55912, 2015 U.S. LEXIS
7985 at *1 (9th Cir. May 12, 2015) (explaining in an unpublished and
nonprecedent case an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing eliminates
any unconscionability).
383. Mohamed, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 16413 at *19.
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D. The Disallowance of Class Actions, PAGA Waivers,
and NLRA Claims Effect On the Vindication of
Rights Doctrine.
This section first analyzes the Ninth Circuit’s decision to allow
Uber to ban class actions, PAGA claims, and administrative labor
claims such as claims made pursuant to the NLRA. Second, it looks
at precedent regarding these three claims.384 It then argues that if
Uber disallows these claims from being heard it is a violation of the
vindication of rights doctrine.385
Uber’s use of waivers in their arbitration agreements, arguably
have disallowed drivers from seeking their constitutional rights and
statutory remedies by requiring drivers to seek small claims
through arbitration.386 The Ninth Circuit does not fully address this
issue in their opinion. The court in a footnote states the option for
drivers to opt-out of the agreement does not require drivers “to
accept a class-action waiver as a condition of employment,” and
thus, “no basis for concluding that [Uber] coerced [Plaintiffs into
waiving their] right to file a class action in violation of the
NLRA.”387
The Supreme Court ruled on this question and issued an
opinion on May 21, 2018.388 The Supreme Court in a five-to-four
decision held the following: “Congress has instructed in the
arbitration act that arbitration agreements providing for
individualized proceedings must be enforced, and therein the
Arbitration Act’s saving clause nor the NLRA suggest otherwise.”389
The Supreme Court in Lewis, stayed on trend with their
previous holdings in the last two decades, by maintaining that the
FAA’s strong preemptive force cannot be overwritten without
congressional intent.390 Collective-bargaining, since the Supreme
Court’s decisions in Conception, has been greatly restricted.391 Most
courts have upheld the usage of class action waivers in arbitration

384. Infra Section D, i, ii, & iii.
385. Id.
386. See Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co. LLC, 61 Cal. 4th at 922 (2015)
(requiring self-help remedies to be carved out of the agreement).
387. Mohamed, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 16413 at *18 (quoting
Johnmohammadi v. Bloomingdale’s Inc., 755 F. 3d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 2014)).
388. Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2014) rev’d Lewis v.
Epic Sys. Corp., No. 16-285, 584 U.S. *2 (2018).
389. Id. See Garrett Epps, An Epic Supreme Court Decision on
Employment, THE ATLANTIC (May 22, 2018),
www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/05/an-epic-supreme-court-decisionon-employment/560963/ (revealing the “5-4 ruling in Epic Systems Corp. v.
Lewis could weaken work place protections and the justices on both sides
knew it.”).
390. Id.
391. AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1740 (2011).
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agreements as being conscionable.392 As the late Justice Scalia
stated in Italian Colors, courts must rigorously enforce arbitration
agreements according to their terms.393 Congress has explicitly
stated that the FAA preemption overcomes any labor statute
allowing for class proceedings to be brought.394 However, an
exception exists when the effective vindication of rights doctrine
applies, and an arbitration clause can be invalidated on “public
policy” grounds because a party does not have a right to pursue a
statutory remedy.395
Therefore, it is of no surprise that Uber, like many other
companies, are well aware that courts have ruled favorably in
upholding class waivers.396 For this reason, Uber purposely put
waivers in both the 2013 and 2014 Agreements.397 These
requirements present degrees of substantive unconscionability.
According to the contracts, Uber requires all drivers to waive their
right to bring class, collective and representative actions including
PAGA claims either in court or in arbitration.398 The 2013
Agreement carved representative actions from being under the
jurisdiction of the arbitrator and instead gave this jurisdiction to
the court.399 In contrast, the 2014 Agreement waives all
representative actions from being brought.
As stated previously in O’Connor, only 269 drivers out of a class
of 160,000 opted out of the 2014 Agreement, meaning only .0017%
used the opt-out option.400 Therefore, 159,731 drivers will have to
392. Id. (“requiring the availability of class wide arbitration infers with
fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus a scheme inconsistent with the
FAA”) (quoting Scalia, A., majority). But see Discover Bank v. Superior Court,
36 Cal 4th at 162-163 (2005) (holding class action waivers to be unenforceable
under California law).
393. Italian Colors Rest, 133 S. Ct. at 2309 (citing Dean Witter Reynolds Inc.
v. Bryd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985)).
394. Horton II, 737 F.3d 344, 358 (5th Cir. 2013); Sutherland v. Ernst &
Young LLP, 726 F.3d 290, 295-296, 297 n.8 (2d Cir. 2013); Owen v. Bristol Care,
Inc., 702 F.3d 1050, 1052 (8th Cir. 2013); See CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood,
132 S. Ct. 665, 669 (2012) (“[The FAA] requires courts to enforce agreements to
arbitrate according to their terms[,] * * * even when the claims at issue are
federal statutory claims, unless the FAA’s mandate has been overridden by a
contrary congressional command.” (quotation marks omitted)).
395. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
at 637 (1985) (stating the exception’s purpose is to prevent a waiver from
allowing a party to pursue statutory remedies).
396. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1740.
397. See Strong, supra note 78 at 269 (“Experience in the judicial realm
suggests that corporate respondents find representative actions both risky and
expensive, and that business interest are therefore included to do everything
possible to minimize or eliminate class relief in all possible forms.”).
398. Mohamed v. Uber Tech. Inc., 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 16413 at *11 (9th
Cir. 2016).
399. Id.
400. Appellee’s Joint Response Brief, supra note 254 at 8. See O’Connor v.
Uber Techs. Inc., No. 1303826-KAW, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110281 at *22 (N.D.
Cal. 2015) (citing the numbers of drivers who opted out of the arbitration
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arbitrate their claim individually in arbitration unless they signed
the 2013 Agreement. Statistics reveal, by not allowing their drivers
to bring a class action, Uber is depriving their employees from
receiving a remedy and vindicating their rights. Specifically, in the
2014 Agreement, Uber drivers are not allowed to bring a class
action in any forum.401
1. Class Action Waivers
Class action waivers are a recent trend, and have only been
used in the last four decades.402 Businesses today use them in most
of their contracts to limit the scale of consumer and employment
disputes.403 Previously, a class action waiver in an arbitration
clause was unconscionable if the contract contained adhesion
involving a small amount of damages, and the party with the
superior bargaining power cheated people out of individually small
sums of money.404 This all changed in Concepcion, when the
Supreme Court explained class waivers are enforceable in
arbitration clauses.405 All courts have explained arbitrators could
violate parties’ procedural rights if the arbitrators were
inexperienced in dealing with the difficulties of class procedures.406
Courts also believe it is hard for arbitrators to impose a procedure
consistent with the parties’ express or implied intent in the
arbitration agreement.407
However, the nature of class actions allow individuals to
vindicate their rights where, if the claimants had to bring the claim
individually, they would not be inclined to do so.408 Individuals, who
normally would not be inclined to bring a claim, do because the
individuals feels more comfortable as there is strength and security
in numbers.409 Justice Breyer has stated class proceedings are an

agreement).
401. Mohamed, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 16413 at *11.
402. Strong, supra note 78 at 201-03 (stating the holding in Stolt-Nielsen,
changed the nature of class proceedings.). See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animal
Feeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. at 1758 (2010) (holding that the arbitration clause
allowed class arbitrations).
403. Strong, supra note 78 at 208 n. 30 (citing “37 % of all class arbitrations
administered by the AAA involved consumer actions, 37 % involved employment
actions, 7 % involved franchising, 7 % involved healthcare, 3% involved
financial services, and 11% involved other business-to-business concerns).
404. Discover Bank, 112 P. 3d at 1108-1109.
405. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1751.
406. Strong, supra note 78 at 221.
407. Id. at 235.
408. Id. at 221. See Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., No. 16-285, 584 U.S. (2018) (R.
Ginsberg) (Dissent) (highlighting the issue that employees are more inclined to
vindicate their rights if allowed to file with their peers).
409. In re Am. Express Merchs’ Litig., 634 F. 3d at 1999 (2d Cir. 2011)
(holding a class waiver precludes plaintiffs from vindicating their rights and is
therefore unenforceable in an arbitration agreement).
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efficient way for thousands of people to bring identical claims and
get vindication for them.410 Class arbitrations and proceedings are
a fair and efficient method to adjudicate controversy by allowing
greater enforcement and vindication.411 Class arbitration allow for
a wide range of substantive claims to be heard.412 Businesses,
however, dislike class relief because it eliminates businesses control
on litigation by creating potential risks, expenses, and bad
publicity.413
The Ninth Circuit failed in their opinion to effectively argue
the vindication of rights doctrine.414 The Ninth Circuit makes no
mention of Gentry, a landmark decision regarding the vindication
of rights doctrine.415 Gentry stated, a class action waiver may be
unenforceable in the following circumstances:
[W]hen it is alleged that an employer has systematically denied
overtime pay to a class employees and a class action is requested
notwithstanding an arbitration agreement that contains a class
action waiver, the trial court must consider these factors … the
modest size of the potential individual recovery, the potential for
retaliation against members of the class, the fact that absent
members of the class may be ill informed about their rights, and other
real world obstacles to the vindication of class members’ right to
overtime pay through individual arbitration.416

In addition to those factors courts should also consider
whether:
A class arbitration is likely significantly more effective practical
means of vindicating the rights of the affected employees than
individual litigation or arbitration, and [whether] the disallowance of
the class action will likely lead to less comprehensive enforcement of
[labor or employment] laws for the employees alleged to be affected
by the employer’s violations.417

The Ninth Circuit here did not evaluate any of these factors,
410. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1759 (Breyer J., Dissenting). See Strong,
supra note 78 at 266 (quoting International Commercial Arbitration, 1746, 2084
(2009) (“Class actions and class arbitration are “a neutral adjudicatory
procedure that afford parties an opportunity to be heard.”) (internally cited).
411. Iskanian v. CLS Transp. LA, LLC, 59 Cal. 4th at 327 (Cal. 2014). But
see Gentry v. Super. Co., 42 Cal 4th at 443 (2007) (concluding class action
waivers in employment arbitration agreements are invalid in certain
circumstances).
412. Strong, supra note 78 at 226.
413. Id.
414. Mohamed v. Uber Tech. Inc., 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 16413 at *19 (9th
Cir. 2016).
415. Gentry, 42 Cal 4th at 443 (regarding an employment contract
containing a class action waiver that disallowed the Plaintiffs from vindicating
their claims against the Defendant employer).
416. Id. at 463-464 (listing the factors for Courts consider when a “de facto
waiver would impermissibly interfere with employees’ ability to vindicate
unwaivable rights.”).
417. Id. at 463.
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but if they had, the Court arguably would have reached another
result. If the Ninth Circuit would have reached their conclusion
based on the precedent in Gentry, the rights of all signatories would
no longer be severally suppressed by businesses’ use of waivers in
arbitration agreements.
2. PAGA Waiver
Regarding the PAGA claim, the Ninth Circuit remanded the
issue of PAGA’s enforceability down to the lower court.418 The
California District Court, found the PAGA clause unenforceable.
The nature of PAGA and the claims that arise under its protection
must proceed as a representative claim and should not be heard
individually.419 Individuals cannot bring a PAGA claim on their own
behalf.420 The California’s legislature when enacting PAGA wanted
to empower employees to enforce the Labor Code as their own
representative because of Agencies’ limited resources.421 Case law
clearly indicates “pre-dispute agreements that waive PAGA claims
are unenforceable under California law.”422 Waivers not allowing
PAGA claims to be heard violate “both the rule against enforcing
agreements exculpating a party for violations of the law (Cal Civ.
Code § 1668), as well as the rule that a law established for a public
reason may not be contravened by private agreement (Cal Civ. Code
§ 3513).”423 An aggrieved employee’s action under PAGA is
analogous to the government bringing a claim against the employer
themselves. Because PAGA’s purpose is to seek statutory penalties
of Labor Code violations for all employees, it must be filed as a
representative action because a judgment binds non-party
aggrieved employees.424
PAGA claims can be heard in court or in arbitration but they
cannot be outright waived.425 A “law established for a public reason

418. Mohamed, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 16413 at *23.
419. Williams v. Super. Ct., 237 Cal. App. 4th 642, 645 (2015) (explaining
PAGA claims “must be brought in a representative capacity,” and “cannot be
split into arbitrable individual claims and non arbitrable representative
claims.”).
420. Brown v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 197 Cal. App. 4th 489, 503 (2011).
421. Private Attorneys General Act, Labor Code § 2699, subdivision (a). See
Armendariz, 24 Cal 4th at 103 (stating legislator enacted PAGA for a public
purpose, and waiving PAGA rights would be against the legislator’s interest in
enforcing labor laws).
422. Sakkab v. Luxottica Retail N. Am. Inc., 803 F. 3d at 430 (9th Cir. 2015)
(explaining the court in Iskanian authorized PAGA waivers to be unenforceable
if they made the parties seek relief individually). See Iskanian, 59 Cal. 4th 348,
382-83 (2014).
423. Id.
424. People v. Pacific Land Research Co, 20 Cal. 3d 10, 17 (1977) cited in
Iskanian, 803 F. 3d at 381.
425. Sakkab, 803 F. 3d at 434.
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cannot be contravened by a private agreement.”426 The FAA also
does not preempt California’s prohibition against PAGA waivers
because of the saving clause in the FAA which allows state labor
laws to be enforced over the FAA.427 The savings clause within the
FAA “forecloses arbitration upon such grounds that exist at law or
in equity for the revocation of any contract and illegality is one of
the grounds.”428 The California legislature enacted PAGA to enforce
employees’ rights.429 A PAGA waiver is outside the FAA’s coverage
because a PAGA dispute is not a contract dispute.430 Instead, “a
PAGA claim is a dispute between an employer and the state, which
alleges directly or through its agents that the employer has violated
the Labor Codes.”431 Therefore, it would be against public policy and
previous precedent to not allow drivers to continue their claims
under PAGA.432
3. NLRA
The Ninth Circuit states the drivers waived their argument
regarding Uber’s violation of the National Labor Relations Act
(“NLRA”).433 The Ninth Circuit revealed, had Uber not waived this
argument, the arbitration agreement still did not violate the NLRA
because Uber drivers were not required to accept the arbitration
clause.434 However, the NLRA allows a broad protection to “full
freedom of association” that includes the right for employees to
pursue joint legal action. Thus, drivers when pursuing claims
against their employer are allowed “mutual aid or protection,”
especially when drivers seek to jointly vindicate rights gained
through legislation or bargaining.
The NLRB for the past seventy years has consistently

426. Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychare Services, Inc., 24 Cal 4th
at 100 (2000).
427. CarMax Auto Superstores Cal., LLC v. Areso, 136 S.Ct. 689, 2015 WL
5005244 (Dec. 14, 2015). See generally Appellee’s Joint Response Brief, supra
note 254 at 26.
428. Brief for Respondent In Opposition, at 12 Epic Systems Corporation v.
Jacob Lewis, (No. 160285) (November 14, 2016).
429. Private Attorneys General Act, Labor Code § 2968.
430. Iskanian v. CLS Transp. LA, LLC, 59 Cal. 4th 327, 386 (2015).
431. Id. at 386-387 (stating when a party seeks civil penalties, and law
enforcement mechanism the party brings the suit with is designed to protect
the public and not private parties the mechanism should be allowed).
432. In re Marriage of Fell, 55 Cal App. 4th 1058, 1065 (1997).
433. Mohamed, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 16413 at *18 n. 6. See
Johnmohammadi, 755 F. 3d 1072, 1077 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding an opt out
clause within an arbitration agreement does not coerce an employee to waive
their NLRA claim, so the arbitration clause does not violate Section 8 of the
NLRA). But see NLRB v. Stone, 125 F. 3d 752, 756 (7th Cir. 1942) (holding an
arbitration agreement that made an employee bargain individually violated the
NLRA whether or not the employer coerced the employee into signing it).
434. Id.
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interpreted the NLRA as a mechanism to protect joint legal action
regardless if the petitioners brought the claim in arbitration or to
courts.435 The Act’s underlying purpose is to “eliminate the causes
of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce …
by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association
… for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their
employment or other mutual aid or protection.”436 Furthermore, the
Court in City Disposal revealed Congress enacted Section 7 to
lessen the employees fear of retaliation by allowing employees to
share the burden of costs to band together against the employer.437
Therefore, the Act reveals Congress’s intent “to create an equality
in bargaining power between the employee and the employer
throughout the entire process.”438 As a result, Courts have given
great deference to the NLRB’s interpretation of the NLRA.439 Other
courts hold that use of class action procedures is not a substantive
right, but instead it is a procedural right. 440 Thus, the NLRA does
override the application of the FAA. For example, the Supreme
Court in Gilmer held, that no language in the NLRA or its
legislative history allows the NLRA to preempt the FAA and make
an arbitration clause unenforceable.441 Previously, the Ninth
Circuit in Richards similarly rejected a plaintiff’s attempt to argue
the unenforceability of an arbitration clause containing a collection
action waiver of NLRA claims. In Lewis, the Seventh Circuit
addressed whether Section 7 of the NLRA qualifies as a contrary
congressional command to overcome the FAA’s presumption that

435. Spandsco Oil & Royalty Co., 42 N.L.R.B. 942, 948-949 (1942) (finding
that employers were protected under the newly enacted NLRA). See also 127
Rest. Corp., 331 N.L.R.B. 269, 275 (2000) (“[T]he filing of a civil action by
employees is protected activity unless done with malice or in bad faith.”); 52nd
St. Hotel Assocs., 321 N.L.R.B. 624, 633 (1996) (“48 … employees … join[ing]
together to seek legal redress for their wage claims [are] engaged in protected,
concerted activity under Section 7.”); cited from Brief for Respondent at 16, Epic
Systems Corporation v. Jacob Lewis (No. 16285) (August 2017).
436. City Disposal, 465 U.S. at 835.
437. Id. (“to equalize the bargaining power of the employee with that of his
employer by allowing employees to band together in confronting an employer
regarding the terms and conditions of their employment.”).
438. Id. at 829 (quoting Eastex, 437 U.S. at 568) (noting also that the NLRB’s
interpretations of ambiguous provisions of the NLRA are entitled to
“considerable deference”).
439. Id.
440. Horton II, 737 F. 3d at 356-60. See Anchhem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor,
521 U.S. 591, 612-613 (explaining the use of class action procedures is not a
substantive right). See also Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326,
332 (1980) (“[T]he right of a litigant to employ Rule 23 is a procedural right only,
ancillary to the litigation of substantive claims.”).
441. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. at 26 (1991) (stating
the NLRA in its’ language and through the Act’s legislative history cannot be
understood to override the application of the FAA). See Sutherland v. Ersnt &
Young, LLP, 726 F. 3d at 297 (2d Cir. 2013) (stating both Concepcion and Gilmer
uphold that waivers of collection action claims are permissible).
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these agreements should be enforced according to their terms.442
In analyzing the NLRA, Section 7 of the Act provides that
employees have the right to self-organize and bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing.443 Section 8 enforces
this right by stating an employer could not “interfere with, restrain
or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights.”444 Courts have
invalidated arbitration provisions that conflict with these statutory
rights.445
The Fifth Circuit applied Section 8 of the NLRA in Horton II.
The Fifth Circuit held if an arbitration clause contained language
that would lead employees to reasonably believe they could not file
unfair labor practices claims with the Board, the arbitration
agreement would violate Section 8(a)(1) and (4) of the NLRA.446 In
Horton II, it identified two separate reasons why a collective-action
waiver might not be enforceable under the FAA—“(1) an arbitration
agreement may be invalidated on any ground that would invalidate
a contract under the FAA’s ‘saving clause’ and (2) application of the
FAA may be precluded by another statute’s contrary congressional
command.”447
In 2015, the Fifth Circuit again in Murphy Oil, held a classaction waiver violated the NLRA.448 Similarly, the Seventh Circuit
in Lewis, held an arbitration agreement violated Sections 7 and 8 of
the NLRA when the provision precluded employees from seeking
class, collective, or representative remedies to wage-and-hour
disputes.449 The Seventh Circuit stated “filing a collective or class
action suit constituted concerted activity under Section 7.”450
Therefore, even when an employee acts alone, he may “engage in
concerted activities where she intends to induce group activity or
acts as a representative of at least one other employee.”451
442. Richards v. Ernst & Young LLP, 734 F.3d 871, 873-74 (9th Cir. 2013)
(stating other Courts should not analyze the NLRB’s decision in D.R Horton as
conflicting with the policies underlying the FAA).
443. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.S. § 157. See Lewis v. Epic Sys.
Corp., 823 F. 3d at 1154 (7th Cir. 2014) (stating the plain language of the NLRA
does not reveal Congress’s intent to exclude class representative, and collective
legal proceedings from NLRA protection).
444. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.S. § 158.
445. McCasktill v. SCI Mgmt Corp., 285 F. 3d 623, 626 (7th Cir. 2002). See
Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. at 637 (1985)
(stating arbitration agreements that act as a “prospective waiver of a party’s
right to pursue statutory remedies” are not enforceable).
446. Horton II, 737 F. 3d at 359.
447. Brief for Respondent In Opposition, at 12-13 Epic Systems Corporation
v. Jacob Lewis, (No. 160285) (November 14, 2016) (citing to Horton II 737 F. 3d
344, 358 (5th Cir. 2013) (internal citation omitted).
448. Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB, 808 F. 3d 1013, 1018 (5th Cir. 2015).
449. Lewis, 823 F. 3d at 1154. See Eastex v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 566 (1978).
(stating under Section 7 of the NLRA “other concerted activities have long been
held to include “resort to administrative and judicial forums.”).
450. Lewis, 823 F. 3d at 1152.
451. Id. (recognizing that before the NLRA “a single employee was helpless
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These two cases were consolidated after the Supreme Court
granted both of Respondents’ writ of certiorari.452 Some Supreme
Court precedent does favor the Seventh Circuit’s ruling. The
Supreme Court in Prima Paint Corp, recognized that the FAA was
designed “to make arbitration agreements as enforceable as other
contracts, but not more so.”453 Thus, the FAA does not preempt
generally applicable contract defenses, nor does the FAA allow
specific terms in the arbitration agreement regarding employees
core federal statutory rights to be nullified.454
Furthermore, in Eastex, the Supreme Court held, “Congress
knew well enough that labor’s cause often is advanced on fronts
other than collective bargaining [and] recognized this fact by
choosing, as the language of § 7 makes clear, to protect concerted
activities for the somewhat broader purpose of ‘mutual aid or
protection’ as well as for the narrower purposes of ‘self-organization’
and ‘collective bargaining.”’455 Although, it is true, the Court in
Eastex did not specifically “address the question of what may
constitute ‘concerted’ activities” when employees sought to improve
their working conditions through judicial and administrative
forums, the Court did address that the NLRA’s purpose would be
disregarded if employees were not protected.456 The courts stated if
the employees were not protected it “would leave employees open to
retaliation for much legitimate activity [and] could frustrate the
policy of the Act to protect the right of workers to act together to
better their working conditions.”457
Here the Ninth Circuit does not state any of this case law nor
do they evaluate Section 7 and 8 of the NLRA. Here, the effect of
Uber’s opt-out provision could contradict the Sections. Seemingly,
the enforceability of a waiver provision depends on whether an optout provision exists, which allows employees to bring a NLRA claim.
The NLRA purposely allows employees to file collective actions
because it falls under the broad definition of a “concerted activity”
under the Act.458 Disallowing employees the right to self-organize,
form, join, or assist labor organizations and to bargain collectively

in dealing with an employer,” and “that union was essential to give laborers
opportunities to deal on equality with their employers.”).
452. Amy Howe, Court Releases October Calendar, SCOTUSBLOG (July
19th,
2017)
www.scotusblog.com/2017/07/court-releases-october-calendar/
(stating petition for a writ of certiorari in Nos. 16-300 and 16-307 is granted).
453. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12
(1967).
454. Id.
455. Eastex, 437 U.S. at 565 (emphasis added).
456. Id. (quotations omitted) (citing to 29 U.S.C. 151).
457. Id.
458. Id. at 1153 (stating while the NLRA did not define “concerted
activities,” collective bargaining and other legal proceedings like it, fit well
within the ordinary meaning of the term).
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goes against the intent for which the NLRA was created.459
However, this argument may no longer be applicable after the
Supreme Court’s holding in Lewis.460 While Lewis was a plurality
opinion, Justice Gorsuch delivered a strong decision in favor of the
FAA and employers.461 The issue in front of the court was “should
employees and employers be allowed to agree that any disputes
between them will be resolved through one-on-one arbitration? Or
should employees always be permitted to bring their claims in class
or collective actions, no matter what they agreed with their
employers?”462 Justice Gorsuch wrote that, as a matter of law, there
is a clear answer that the FAA preempts the NLRA; however, as a
matter of policy, the questions are more convoluted.463 He continued
with the following holding:
In the Federal Arbitration Act, Congress has instructed federal courts
to enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms—
including terms providing for individualized proceedings. Nor can we
agree with the employees’ suggestion that the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA) offers a conflicting command. It is this Court’s
duty to interpret Congress’s statutes as a harmonious whole rather
than at war with one another. And abiding that duty here leads to an
unmistakable conclusion. The NLRA secures to employees rights to
organize unions and bargain collectively, but it says nothing about
how judges and arbitrators must try legal disputes that leave the
workplace and enter the courtroom or arbitral forum. This Court has
never read a right to class actions into the NLRA—and for three quarters of a century neither did the National Labor Relations Board. Far
from conflicting, the Arbitration Act and the NLRA have long enjoyed
separate spheres of influence and neither permits this Court to
declare the parties’ agreements unlawful.464

The dissent by Justice Ginsberg took a strong stance against
the FAA and its ability to inhibit employees’ from receiving
protection under the NLRA.465 Justice Ginsberg stated that answer
to the question of allowing the FAA to trump the NLRA and
employees’ ability to engage in “concerted activities” for their
“mutual aid or protection,” should be a resounding “NO.” Ginsberg
continued by stating:
The Court today subordinates employee-protective labor legislation

459. Id. at 1154.
460. Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., No. 16-285, 584 U.S. (2018).
461. Id. at *2.
462. Id. See Epps, supra note 389 (quoting that “Gorsuch accused Ginsburg,
author of the dissent, and the other three moderate liberals—Breyer,
Sotomayor, and Kagan—of improperly consulting their own policy preferences,
refusing to harmonize two easily reconcilable federal statutes, and illicitly
smuggling extra-legal commentary—legislative history—into judicial
decisions.”)
463. Id.
464. Id. (quoting Justice Gorsuch).
465. Id. at *1 (Ginsburg J., dissenting).
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to the Arbitration Act. In so doing, the Court forgets the labor market
imbalance that gave rise to the NLGA and the NLRA, and ignores the
destructive consequences of diminishing the right of employees “to
band together in confronting an employer…In stark contrast to
today’s decision,16 the Court has repeatedly recognized the centrality
of group action to the effective enforcement of antidiscrimination
statutes. With Court approbation, concerted legal actions have played
acritical role in enforcing prohibitions against work place
discrimination based on race, sex, and other protected
characteristics…Recognizing employees’ right to engage in collective
employment litigation and shielding that right from employer
blockage are firmly rooted in the NLRA’s design.466

Justice Ginsberg argues that the majority’s conception that
the NLRA does not contain Congress’s express intent within the
NLRA is faulty, for Congress intended when enacting the NLRA, to
“protec[t] the exercise by workers of full freedom of association,”
thereby remedying “[t]he inequality of bargaining power workers
faced,” and when (“[I]n enacting §7 of the NLRA, Congress sought
generally to equalize the bargaining power of the employee with
that of his employer by allowing employees to band together in
confronting an employer regarding the terms and conditions of their
employment.”).467 Justice Ginsberg explained that the majority’s
decision is an “empathetic direction” to enforce arbitration
agreements and prohibit collective-litigation prohibitions even
though “[n]othing in the FAA or this Court’s case law, however,
requires subordination of the NLRA’s protections.” Justice Ginsberg
concluded explaining the devastating affect the decision will have
on the justice system ability to protect employees against abuse.468
In stark contrast to today’s decision, the Court has repeatedly
recognized the centrality of group action to the effective enforcement
of antidiscrimination statutes. With Court approbation, concerted
legal actions have played acritical role in enforcing prohibitions
against work place discrimination based on race, sex, and other
protected characteristics. In this context, the Court has
comprehended that government entities charged with enforcing
antidiscrimination statutes are unlikely to be funded at levels that
could even begin to compensate for a significant drop-off in private
enforcement efforts.469

As a result, as discussed previously employees will be less
likely to file against the employer if they must bring the claim
individually, as class actions and collective bargaining attempts

466. Id. at *1, 2.
467. Id. at *9 (citing City Disposal, 465 U.S. at 835); see, e.g., Eastex, Inc. v.
NLRB, 437 U. S. 556, 567 (1978) (the Act’s policy is “to protect the right of
workers to act together to better their working conditions” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
468. Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 584 U.S. at *28 (2018).
469. Id.
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brings employee comfort in numbers.470 Thus, employees, like the
Uber drivers in Mohammed have less of an opportunity to seek the
appropriate redress to vindicate their rights.471

IV. PROPOSAL
First, employers and their attorneys must be conscious of the
language within the arbitration agreement. Poorly drafted
arbitration agreements contain the following problematic factors: 1)
the language is contradictory to the type of dispute mechanism to
be used (litigation or arbitration); 2) the language does not provide
specifies with regard to the manner in which an arbitration should
be conducted; 3) the language opens the door to multiple parallel
proceedings; and 4) the language provides for no timetable or
deadline of when arbitration must be filed.472 Well-drafted
arbitration agreements, however, include the following factors: 1)
clear choice-of-law clause; 2) the subject-matter that the arbitration
agreement pertains too; 3) the number and method of selecting
arbitrators; 4) where the arbitration will occur; 5) who will pay for
the arbitration agreement and in what currency will the arbitration
be paid for; and 6) if the arbitration restricts a class actions being
heard.473
Furthermore, if the parties want the dispute to go to court the
language in the agreement should be bolded, in all caps, and
specifically state “all claims arising out of this agreement are
subject to a court of competent jurisdiction in…” and include the
forum and choice of law that the agreement will be subject too. This
language removes ambiguity from the agreement and reduces
confusion amongst the parties. Thus, if the drafter of arbitration
agreements and employment contracts use clear and specific
language, the severe headache of interpreting the language in the
future is immensely reduced.474
Next, when micro-analyzing the implications of the Ninth
Circuit’s opinion in Mohamed, it is clear courts have struggled to
adjudicate Uber claims because the claims do not fall under the
existing regulatory framework.475 Thus far, Uber has been able to
ignore certain regulations because the company claims to be a
technology platform.476 Uber believes this label does no subject

470. Mohamed v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 15-16178, No. 15-16181, No-1516250, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 16413 *21.
471. Marinelli, supra note 11.
472. Id.
473. Id. (referring to LCIA.org and ADR.org practice tips).
474. Id.
475. Lisa Rayle et al., App-Based, On-Demand Rider Services: Comparing
Taxi and Ridesourcing Trips and Uber Characteristics in San Francisco, UCTC
Working Paper No. 8, at 3 (2014).
476. Mitchell, supra note 32 at n. 6-9.
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them to standard transportation regulations and employment
laws.477 However, while Uber needs better regulation, Congress’s
failure to regulate Uber is not the greatest concern arising out of
the decision in Mohamed nor is it a discussion for this Comment.
On a macro scale, the Ninth Circuit’s decision interposes a
bigger issue: the problematic trend of courts mandating arbitration.
These mandates force employees to forego their constitutional and
statutory rights. This problem calls for immediate reform of the
FAA. The statute is outdated and has developed into a scheme that
primarily serves the needs of employers, who possess more
bargaining power, without protecting the needs of employees.478
The system needs to change to not only reflect societal changes in
technology but also to take into account the interest of employees.
A change to the system will undoubtedly be difficult and implicate
current jurisprudence favoring FAA preemption. It is clear from the
vast number of circuit splits, and close 5-4 Supreme Court decisions
in Concepcion, and recently in Lewis, that courts remain uncertain
about interpreting the FAA overly-broad.479
Immediate reform is also necessary because under the current
system, drivers are not able to effectively vindicate their rights.
Forcing drivers to waive their right to representative relief and
federal statutory rights is a due process violation and a violation of
employees’ constitutional right to have their claim be decided by a
judge or jury.480 Uber’s label of drivers as independent contractors
should not affect drivers’ ability to seek the appropriate redress the
law entitles them to.481 No matter what label drivers receive every
477. Id. at *1 (“Uber attempts to avoid liability from these claims by
claiming to be a technology platform, rather than a transportation company,
because they connect people who need rides with independent contractors who
can provide them.”).
478. Weston, supra note 12 at 137 (citing “the U.S. Supreme Court has,
arguably incorrectly, interpreted the FAA to apply to ordinary employment to
preempt state administrative procedures, and a practical matter to make
impossible the enforcement of access to class relief necessary to vindicate even
federal statutory rights.”).
479. Catherine L. Fisk, Collective Actions and Joinder of Parties in
Arbitration: Implications of DR Horton and Concepcion, 35 BERKELEY J. EMP.
& LAB. L. 175, 179 (2014) ("The Fifth Circuit majority's assumption, like the
Supreme Court majority's in Concepcion, that individual determination of
claims is better suited to arbitration is simply wrong in many cases."). See
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. at 24 (1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the majority's interpretation of 9 U.S.C. § 2 is "unquestionably
wrong.").
480. Strong, supra note 78 at 269. See Meyer v. Kalanick, 2016 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS at *1 (“Since the Late eighteenth century, the Constitution of the United
States and the constitutions or laws of the several states have guaranteed U.S.
citizens the right to a jury trial. This most precious and fundamental right can
be waived only if the waiver is knowing and voluntary with the courts.”) (Rakoff,
R.).
481. Dara Kerr, UK Court Rules Uber Drivers Employees, Not Contractors,
C NET (October 28, 2016), www.cnet.com/news/uber-uk-court-ruling-drivers-
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time they turn on their Uber app to drive, they perform a service,
and doing so puts them at risk for liability. A risk which most Uber
drivers are not aware they are subject too. Giving corporations the
power to protect their own business interest by eliminating class
relief is not only unfair to employees but it is unjust. In considering
what corporate interests are, it is quite alarming that courts are
choosing those interests over a larger societal interest in protecting
the weaker party.482
Regarding class arbitrations, courts should consider that by
disallowing class arbitrations, they are discouraging employees
from bringing suit. Justice Breyer stated in the Concepcion dissent
that class arbitrations are “more efficient than thousands of spate
proceedings for identical claims.”483 Since Concepcion, Justice
Scalia had been the biggest proponent of allowing class action
waivers in arbitration clauses as well as a major advocate for
businesses.484
Now Justice Gorsuch has taken over Justice Scalia’s role, as an
advocate for businesses and a critic of administrative agencies as
demonstrated in Lewis, where the Supreme Court again narrowed
the protection for employees’ rights.485 This Comment proposes that
Congress must enact an alternative regulatory scheme to reform
the FAA. A proposal that also has been accepted by Justice
Ginsberg who stated that she personally will push Congress to
consider enacting legislation to resolve the dispute between the
FAA and labor related statutes.486 By adding an amendment to the

employees-not-contractors/ (last visited February 9, 2017) (analyzing while
drivers want to be independent, drivers should still be protected by employment
laws). See Dan Levine, Uber Drivers Remain Independent Contractors as
Lawsuit
Settled,
TECHNOLOGY
NEWS
(April
22,
2016),
www.reuters.com/article/us-uber-tech-drivers-settlement-idUSKCN0XJ07H
(last visited February 9, 2017) (stating that while Judge Chen held Uber drivers
are ultimately independent contractors, drivers are still deserving of just
compensation).
482. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animal Feeds Int’l Corp., 130 S Ct. at 1783
(2010) (Ginsburg J. dissenting) (stating “when adjudication is costly and
individual claims are no more than modest in size class proceedings may be “the
thing” i.e., without them, potential claimants will have little if any incentive to
seek vindication of their rights.”) (emphasis added). See also Carnegie v.
Household Int'l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (CA7 2004) (“The realistic alternative
to a class action is not 17 million individual suits, but zero individual suits, as
only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.”).
483. AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct at 1759 (2011) (Breyer,
J. dissenting). See Strong, supra note 78 at 236 (“In a judicial multiparty
proceeding, benefits accrue to both parties (by resolving the dispute at a single
time in a single forum and court itself (by reducing the burden on judicial
resources.”).
484. Judy Greenwald, Scalia’s Death Limits Chances for Pro-Business
Ruling, BUS. INS. (February 28, 2016, 12:00 AM), www.business
insurance.com/article/20160228/AUDIO/160229860.
485. Marinelli, supra note 11.
486. Staples, supra note 222.
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FAA, the federal policy favoring arbitration could remain intact
while providing clarity on how the FAA should be interpreted with
other labor statutes.487 Also, a change could be made to pre-dispute
arbitration to clarify if claimants should file with an arbitrator or
with a court. The FAA could specify whether claims are subject to
FAA procedures, or administrative law procedures, regarding the
NLRA and state labor regulations like PAGA.
First, in regard to pre-dispute arbitration, a uniform procedure
needs to be defined in determining arbitrability. Currently, predispute arbitration is convoluted and confusing as to whether the
contracting language designates a judge or arbitrator to decide the
agreement’s arbitrability. The FAA should state a clear procedure
as to who decides arbitrability, so courts no longer have the burden
of deciding the parties’ contractual intentions. The FAA should
specifically state what contract language parties must use if they
want their claims to be delegated to the arbitrator or judge. The
FAA should also require the parties to declare whether the issue of
arbitrability is to be decided by the judge or arbitrator. As a result,
the parties would maintain contracting power but their contracts
would be properly worded to avoid any disputed ambiguity. If this
approach is unsuccessful the FAA could prohibit the enforcement of
pre-dispute arbitration contracts in consumer, civil rights,
antitrust, and employment contracts cases.
Second, arbitration can conflict with federal and state
statutory rights. As a result, parties can be “denied important
protections of our justice system, which include administrative
remedies and the ability to utilize class or group actions to
affordably obtain counsel less likely to take small claims or
complicated antitrust cases on an individual basis.”488 Congress
should recognize that the broad interpretation of the FAA has
violated these statutory rights, and limit the FAA’s ability to
preempt administrative remedies.489 Congress could also protect
substantive rights that are protected by administrative procedures
by creating a new regulatory agency. This agency could have
independent authority to rectify statutory violations.490 In order for
an agency to be effective, however, the FAA must disallow arbitral
class waivers that prevent these claims from being adjudicated.
487. Id.
488. Weston, supra note 12 at 137 (“Attempts to change the scope of
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration have met limited success. The proposed
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013, versions of which have been introduced since
2007, seeks to prohibit enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration contracts in
consumer, civil rights, antitrust and employment matters.”). Arbitration
Fairness Act of 2013 S.878 113th Cong. § 402 (a) (2013).
489. See Jean R. Sternlight, Disarming Employees: How American
Employers Are Using Mandatory Arbitration to Deprive Workers of Legal
Protection, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 1309, 1334-40 (2015) (discussing the burden
employees face in obtaining legal representation in arbitration).
490. Weston, supra note 12 at 140.
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Third, the FAA should be amended to require employers to give
better notice to their employees that a mandatory arbitration clause
exists within the contract. Employees should receive brief analysis
of what arbitration is and the effect an arbitration agreement can
have on the employees’ rights. Also, in order to ensure all
arbitration clauses are not unconscionable, the FAA should require
all arbitration agreements contain opt-out clauses. That way an
employees’ right to trial is not taken away and the employee is given
the discretion to choose whether or not he wants to litigate his
claims in arbitration. To avoid unconscionable contracts, employers
should be required to tell their employees what will occur if the
employees choose not to opt-out of the arbitration clause. This
process will ensure that the employees are made aware of their
rights and are not contracting against his will.
Last, if Congress does not want to create a federal agency, it
could attempt to delegate the authority to the states. The claims
would first be heard by the state regulatory board.491 The regulatory
board would hear all claims involving federal and statutory rights.
The board would then decide what venue is proper for the claim to
be adjudicated. However, this proposal is likely unrealistic because
it exceeds the scope of the state’s police power. Consequently, while
the federal government can condition the reception of money with
requests to act, ultimately the federal government cannot force the
states to do anything. Asking the states to enact a law that would
cost the state money would not sit well with states’ government. The
proposal also may be expensive for certain states to implement. The
best plan is for Congress to encourage the states to aid by awarding
grant money or tax incentives.
Until the FAA is reformed, administrative agencies have a
duty to make employees more aware of their workplace rights and
the administrative remedies that are available.492 Federal and state
agencies should raise awareness about the consequences of predispute arbitration contracts by using simple marketing strategies.
These strategies include providing notice to employees on the
agencies’ websites, requiring human resource departments to hold
mandatory informational sessions, and by posting information on
the agencies’ social media. Current employees need better
education of what their statutory rights are. Employees need to be
expressly informed that mandated arbitration does not prohibit
employees from filing complaints with state or federal regulatory
agencies.493 If employees were more informed of their rights, it
would lead to more employees receiving deserved redress, and a
491. William A. Herbert and Alicia McNally, Just Cause Discipline for Social
Networking in the New Gilded Age: Will the Law Look the Other Way? 54 U.
LOUISVILLE L. REV 381, 434 (2016).
492. Weston, supra note 12 at 140.
493. See Id. (stating practical education to employees could provide
awareness to mandatory arbitration and administrative access).
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greater push for reform of the unfair system.

V. CONCLUSION
As technology continues to evolve and society continues to
change, Congress can no longer stubbornly refuse to reform the FAA
and allow courts to continue to wrestle with the issues the outdated
FAA has caused. The FAA and its preemptive force has created a
significant policy concern for employees. If Courts continue to allow
companies to use the FAA as a means of protection, employees will
continue to be precluded from vindicating their rights and receiving
protection from administrative agencies. The current trend to allow
class action, collective action, and representation claims to be
waived, unfairly alters the scheme of justice needed to uphold our
system. If the FAA remains unchanged, it will continue to violate
due process, and the principles of federalism. Most importantly it
will continue to violate the fundamental principle of the United
States government: the separation of powers.
The proposed changes to the FAA would allow for the
implementation of actual and meaningful reform to all arbitration
contracts. Congressional intervention is required because the courts
refuse to come to a uniform decision. Further, states lack the police
power to override a federal statute and do not have the means to
regulate multinational and international companies’ employment
contracts. Therefore, it is up to Congress to change the system and
uphold the pillars of fairness and justice in the U.S. legal system.

